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MARKETS FOR NATURE
BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION: REGULATORY MARKETS VERSUS MARKETS FOR NATURE
The environment is a good in more than one sense of the word. The
environment is beneficent to humanity, nurturing us, entertaining us,
enlightening us, and providing us with the foundations of life-air, water,
food, and a sustaining climate. To many, the environment reflects innate
virtue as either God's handiwork or the aesthetic consequence of elegant
physical laws. For these reasons, there is also human demand for protecting,
sustaining, and enjoying the environment. The environment, in short, is also
an economic "good." Although we are used to receiving for free many of the
services and amenities provided by the environment, those services and
amenities have value to us for which we would each be willing to pay some
sum. "Natural" resources such as water, petroleum, and fish are already
economic commodities, but as a consequence of their consumptive values.
The values provided by a preserved nature raise the possibility that market
systems also can support efforts to protect watersheds and other natural
ecosystems. Markets for nature hold out the promise of a third rail, along
with regulation and education, for preservation efforts.
The last several decades have experienced growing interest in and use
of environmental markets. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments included
pollution emission trading as a central element of their acid rain program.'
Los Angeles and other regions of the nation have developed emission trading
systems as part of their local efforts to meet national air quality standards.2
* Vice-Dean and Robert E. Paradise Professor of Natural Resources Law, Stanford
University. I would like to thank the organizers of and participants at the William and Mary
Environmental Law and Policy symposium Water Rights and Watershed Management:
Planning for the Future for their tremendous hospitality and their valuable feedback on the
presentation out of which this essay grew. Thanks also to Greg Thomas and David Fullerton
of the Natural Heritage Institute for their comments and for their work in promoting markets
for nature.
I Clean Air Act § 401, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651(1990).
2 See Vivien Foster & Robert H. Hahn, Designing More Efficient Markets: Lessons From Los
Angeles Smog Control, 38 J.L. & ECON. 19 (1995) (describing and analyzing the RECLAIM
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Wetland banks have sprouted across the country, allowing developers to trade
off the development of one stretch of wetlands for the restoration of a
different reach.3 Once quiet water markets have grown dramatically in the
western United States as regulators have limited new water diversi6ns and,
in a few cases, required actual reductions in withdrawals.4
These markets, however, are not primarily markets for nature in
which market participants are seeking to restore or preserve nature, but
"regulatory markets" enabling regulated entities like factories or developers
to trade entitlements to consume the environment. The principal purpose of
these markets is to reduce the cost of environmental regulation by providing
the regulated community with greater flexibility. In each of the examples
just cited, a traditional regulatory system determines the level of
environmental protection. The Clean Air Act fixes the amount of sulfur
dioxide that utilities can emit; state implementation plans set local emission
levels; the Army Corps of Engineers determines how many acres of wetlands
to preserve; water agencies direct how much water can be diverted from
waterways. Governments superimpose market structures onto these
regulatory systems primarily to ensure that the limited rights to pollute,
develop wetlands, and divert water are used efficiently, thus minimizing the
cost of the regulation to the economy.
Even "regulatory markets" can benefit the environment indirectly, as
traditional water markets illustrate. First, regulatory markets may reduce
opposition to regulatory initiatives both by reducing the economic cost of
regulation and by reducing tension between interest groups fighting over who
will bear the regulatory cost. Assume, for example, that the government is
considering reducing all diversions from a stream by fifty percent. Current
water users are almost certain to oppose the reduction. But the addition of a
water market may help soften the opposition. Without a market, water users
trading program adopted by the South Coast Air Quality Management District in California);
DALE B. THOMPSON, CAN CONSUMER GROUPS HAVE MORE POLITICAL CLOUT THAN
REGULATED INDUSTRIES?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE RECLAIM
EMISSIONS MARKET (Olin Sch. of Bus., Wash. U., Working Paper Series No. 97-20, 1998).
3 See Jim Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law,
52 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) (describing and critiquing existing wetlands banks in
the United States).
4 For a recent survey of the growth in California water markets over the last two decades, see
Richard Howitt & David Sunding, An Overview of Water Markets in California (Aug. 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on fie with the William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy
Review). The Water Strategist, a monthly water newsletter, provides regular surveys of the
increasing number of market transactions in the western United States.
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will view the reduction as a pure and simple loss; those who do not believe
they can get by with significantly less water and have considerable capital
invested in their current business will be adamant opponents of the reduction.
A water market would permit these users to purchase whatever water is
needed to remain in operation, reducing the size of their potential loss and
thus perhaps the strength of their opposition. Other water users may see a
potential to profit by selling a portion of their water allocation to those unable
to reduce their water use as readily. If the cost to the user of reducing water
use is sufficiently low and water prices are sufficiently sensitive to supply
changes, the profit could even exceed the value of the water that the user
loses through regulation. Not surprisingly, efforts to reduce water use in
California's Sacramento-San Joaquin rivers system, and to preserve the delta
east of San Francisco Bay, have recognized the importance of water markets
in gaining needed consensus.'
Reducing the cost of regulation is only one of the ways regulatory
markets can make it easier to adopt water reductions. A politically difficult
question facing any state wishing to order a reduction in water use is how to
allocate the reduction. Water users with historically high consumption levels,
such as farmers, are likely to argue that, for equitable reasons, reductions
should be proportional to historic use or reflective of seniority. Other water
users such as cities or industries are likely to urge that allocations instead
should reflect the economic value of water or predicted increases in future
demand. Water markets provide a means by which the government can meet
the concerns of both groups. The government can allocate reductions based
on historical use or seniority and rely on the market for meeting economic
needs and changing demands. The Texas legislature adopted exactly this
approach in regulating withdrawals from the overdrafted Edwards Aquifer,
pairing proportionate reductions in withdrawals with a water market through
which San Antonio and other local cities can lease or purchase more water
for their growing populations.'
By providing an alternative mechanism for individuals and entities to
satisfy their resource demands, markets also can reduce pressure to further
injure the environment. Water markets again provide a useful illustration.
Like it or not, growth is all but inevitable in many regions of the United
5 See CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, PROGRAMMATIC RECORD OF DECISION 71-72 (Aug.
28, 2000) (discussing steps to be taken to promote water marketing).
6 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 266-267 (2000) (describing the use of markets in restricting
withdrawals from the Edwards Aquifer).
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States, and to the degree that local water conservation is costly or
technologically limited, growing regions will look elsewhere for new water
supplies. Absent water markets, the regions will likely look to distant
watersheds with untapped supplies, lobby to relax existing instream
standards, or construct new storage reservoirs to catch every drop of available
water. Water markets open up a potentially more benign means of meeting
growing demand: the acquisition of existing water rights from other users.
With agriculture consuming over 80 percent of water in the western United
States, the transfer of merely a tenth of current agricultural water can more
than double the water available for growing metropolitan areas.7
Finally, by providing an economic incentive to reduce resource
consumption, markets in theory can promote the development and
implementation of new conservation technology. Consider water markets yet
again. Because water is scarce and costs something to transport and store,
farmers already have a reason to find and implement new irrigation
technologies to reduce their water use. But markets provide an important
added incentive by giving farmers the option of selling conserved water for
more than the water's opportunity cost. The installation of new irrigation
equipment, moreover, often requires significant capital that farmers may not
have absent marketing opportunities. Here again, the value to the
environment is only indirect. The development of new technology is unlikely
to increase instream flows unless regulators insist that a percentage of any
conserved water be returned to the river. Oregon has taken this approach,
requiring that a quarter of any water conserved by existing users (up to 75
percent if public funds are used to finance the conservation) be returned to the
state for instream flow or use by others.8 But most states do not link
conservation and streamflows.
Beyond the odd anecdote, unfortunately, the actual value of pure
regulatory markets to environmental preservation remains questionable.
Although water users may prefer water reductions paired with a market to
unadorned reductions, most water users will still prefer the status quo and
oppose any reductions. Texas cities have fought implementation of the
7 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Allocation and Protection: A United States Case
Study, in EARTH SYSTEMS: PROCESSES AND IssuEs 476, 487 (W.G. Ernst ed., 2000) (noting
that 5 percent of agricultural water use in Arizona could satisfy the domestic demands of half
the population of the state).
8 See OR. REV. STAT. § 537.470(3) (1998). The Oregon Water Resources Commission
determines whether the state's share of the conserved water is needed for instream flow
purposes; if the Commission decides that it is not, the state's share becomes available for
appropriation by junior water users. See id.
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Edward Aquifer reductions noted earlier, despite the ability to purchase
groundwater rights from willing farmers. Growing metropolitan areas are
engaged in constructing far fewer and smaller water projects than several
decades ago, but the change is probably attributable more to tougher
environmental laws, fewer available project sites, and scarcer funding than
to the opportunity to purchase needed water. Water markets are now helping
to meet the needs of growing cities in the Southwest, but pressure for new
water projects continues. 9
Similar stories can be told about other forms of regulatory markets.
Addition of a trading system to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
reportedly won crucial support for inclusion of SO 2 acid rain provisions in
the legislation.'0 Wetland mitigation banks have permitted government
regulators to do a more effective job of restoring and enhancing wetlands by
trading off the development of small, isolated wetlands for the restoration and
preservation of larger wetlands with greater ecosystem value." Economists
and others have long touted local emission trading systems as providing an
incentive for the development of new emission reduction technology-and
thus stricter pollution standards. 12 But most of the potential advantages to the
environment are more theoretical than proven. 3
The question thus becomes whether there is a more robust and direct
role for markets in preserving the environment. This Essay briefly surveys
three other potential types of market approaches and illustrates how they
9 See, e.g., Rodney T. Smith & Roger Vaughan, Trading Federal Project Water: The
Colorado-Big Thompson Project, WATER STRATEGIST, Oct. 1990, at 1-13 (noting that some
cities are pursuing "trade and develop" strategies).
10 See David B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the Foundations of
Environmental Law in the 21s t Century, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 145, 160 n.61 (1995).
1 See Jennifer Neal, Paving the Road to Wetland Mitigation Banking, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REv. 161 (1999). Much of the literature on wetland mitigation banks, however, has been
quite critical of the actual implementation of the banking systems. See, e.g., S. Scott
Burkhalter, Oversimplification: Value and Function: Wetland Mitigation Banking, 2 CHAP.
L. REV. 261 (1999). Lisa M. Schenck, Wetlands Protection: Regulators Need to Give Credit
to Mitigation Banking, 9 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 103 (2000).
12 See Esther Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Cost
Savings, 23 ENVTL. L. 43, 70 (1993).
13 Some legal academics, for example, have suggested that the empirical evidence to date
does not support the contention that pollution markets have led to the creation of new
pollution control technology. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic
Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy,
55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 289, 313-22, 324-36 (1998). Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of
Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 83, 109 n.102.
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might be used to preserve and restore watersheds. Part II examines purchases
or leases of water rights by governmental agencies or nonprofit organizations
for instream flows needed by fish and wildlife. Such acquisitions are an
example of a "public goods market" where the government or a philanthropic
organization uses the marketplace rather than regulation to provide a public
good with diffuse benefits to a large segment of the population. Because of
collective action problems, public goods markets are unlikely to provide a
societally optimal level of instream flows, open space, and other
environmental goods. But they might play an invaluable role in
supplementing regulatory efforts.
Part III considers the degree to which the economic benefits of
watershed protection, in the form of higher water quality or reduced flood
threats, might encourage water suppliers, flood control districts, or others to
invest in the acquisition and preservation of critical watershed land. In
contrast to "public good" markets, acquisitions of watershed rights by water
suppliers or flood control districts are motivated by direct economic benefit;
watersheds provide a variety of natural services that are economically
valuable to the purchasers. Such acquisitions thus are examples of
"ecosystem service markets." Where the economic value of ecosystem
services is large, such markets may significantly augment public preservation
efforts.
Regulatory markets, public good markets, and ecosystem service
markets will often constitute overlapping subsets of a broader generic market.
Water markets, for example, have traditionally served as regulatory markets
but are increasingly being used by governmental agencies and nonprofits to
acquire instream flows; a farmer interested in selling water, moreover, is
unlikely to care about the purpose to which a purchaser plans to put the
water. Water markets in some states thus have become undifferentiated
markets for both regulatory flexibility and public goods. Where instream
flows provide a valuable ecosystem service to commercial interests (e.g., as
habitat for a commercial fish species), water markets also theoretically could
serve as ecosystem service markets. Ideally the government would permit
water markets to be used for all three forms of market transactions. In a
similar fashion, environmental groups have sometimes purchased pollution
emission credits, using what is largely a regulatory market for the acquisition
of a public good.
Although markets might frequently serve multiple purposes, the
distinction among regulatory markets, public good markets, and ecosystem
service markets is analytically important for several reasons. First, some
states currently preclude one or another form of market. As explained in Part
266 [Vol.25:261
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II, for example, many states prohibit the acquisition of water for instream
flow-precluding both public good and ecosystem service transactions; in
these states, water markets serve as purely regulatory markets. Some states
also preclude the acquisition of other rights, such as grazing permits, by non-
profit organizations interested in retiring them. Second, each type of market
has different needs and generates different policy issues. If a government is
interested in creating a public good market, it will face quite different issues
than if it wishes to foster a regulatory market. Finally, the debate over using
markets to promote the environment has historically focused on regulatory
markets, ignoring or marginalizing other important ways in which markets
can prove environmentally beneficial.
Part IV examines the more radical concept of integrating market
concepts into the regulatory process itself by creating what might be called
an "environmental broker." Regulatory markets are adjuncts to regulation,
providing the regulated community with useful flexibility but not directly
affecting the regulatory decision itself. Acquisitions of instream and
watershed rights through public good markets or ecosystem service markets
are merely substitutes for or additions to traditional regulation. The concept
of an "environmental broker," by contrast, would alter the very structure of
regulation by making regulators themselves market participants. Under an
environmental broker approach, the regulator would receive a set quantity of
environmental rights-e.g., instream flows--or the monetary equivalent and
then engage in market transactions to maximize the environmental value of
its "portfolio" in light of changing scientific information and market
opportunities. As discussed in Part IV, such an approach offers the potential
for more rapid and disciplined regulation, but may require greater scientific
expertise and institutional flexibility than currently exists.
II. PUBLIC GOOD MARKETS: ACQUIRING WATER RIGHTS FOR INSTREAM
FLOWS
The growing number of water acquisitions by governments and
nonprofit environmental groups interested in dedicating the water to instream
flows is one of the best examples today of an effective public good market.
Instream flow markets are found almost exclusively in the western United
States. To understand why, and to appreciate the significance of instream
flow markets, it is useful to provide a brief primer on western water resources
and policy.
In the United States, East and West-defined for water purposes by
the 100'" meridian that forms the eastern edge of the Texas panhandle-differ
2000]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
dramatically both in their hydroscape and water law. The East is
characterized by high levels of precipitation and massive rivers. All four of
the nation's largest rivers-the Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, and St. Lawrence
-flow through the East. 4 In this setting, the health of rivers is threatened far
less by water diversions than by pollution and dams. In most of the West, by
contrast, rainfall is sufficiently low that farmers must irrigate their crops, and
few cities of any size can depend on purely local water supplies to support
their burgeoning populations. Rivers, moreover, pale by comparison to their
eastern compatriots. The Colorado River, which dominates the Southwest
and is the West's second largest river, ranks only 25 th in the nation and carries
less than 5 percent of the streamflow of the Mississippi." As a result, the
West for the last 150 years has drained many of its rivers dry, and left many
others mere trickles, with obvious and serious repercussions for the fish and
wildlife dependent on the rivers. 6
The water law of the two regions has reflected the regions' differing
uses of water. In the East, rivers are as much a means of transportation and
power as a source of consumptive water for cities, industry, and agriculture.
Water diversions are governed by the riparian doctrine, which entitles all
riparian landowners to a reasonable share of water but, more importantly, has
always respected the instream needs for water.' 7 In the West, consumption
has been the name of the game. To develop the urban and agricultural
regions that dominate today's West, the region had to divert and move
massive flows of water. These diversions have been governed by the prior
appropriation doctrine, which awards the right to divert and consume water
on a first-come, first-served basis and, for many years, promoted the very
depletion of the West's rivers that is now a source of serious environmental
14 Thompson, supra note 7, at 479.
15 Id. at 479.
16 See, e.g., id. at 484 (noting that river depletion has led to the extinction of some fish
species and serious population declines in other species of fish and wildlife); Jack Sterne,
Instream Rights & Invisible Hands: Prospects for Private Instream Water Rights in the
Northwest, 27 ENVTL. L. 203, 203-04 (1997) (describing the impact of reduced stream flows
on salmon in the Pacific Northwest). For an excellent discussion of the impacts from stream
depletion in California and the reasons to preserve instream flow, see Gregory A. Thomas,
Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A Critical Comparison of Legal Tools for Augmenting
Streamflows in California, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 5-12 (1996).
17 See generally Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law
Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 290-93 (1990) (discussing the importance of instream
uses to eastern water law).
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concern." From the standpoint of both hydroscape and law, stream depletion
thus is a problem primarily of the western United States.
Over the past several decades, the West has made major strides
toward protecting its remaining streamflow. The federal and some state
governments have adopted wild and scenic river protections;' 9 some states
have authorized their environmental agencies to "reserve" unappropriated
water from future appropriation;20 a growing number of state agencies,
sometimes bolstered by new legislative requirements or court-recognized
public trust responsibilities, have scrutinized and denied new appropriation
requests because of instream concerns;2 environmental statutes such as the
Clean Water Act and Endangered Species Act have precluded new
diversions.22 But protecting what water remains in the West's rivers and
streams is the easy part. Tremendous work remains to restore the West's
waterways by reducing historic diversions and thus increasing instream flow
from its currently low level. One potentially important tool for
accomplishing this goal is the purchase, by government or private entities, of
current appropriative water rights and dedication of the water to instream
flow.
As shown in Figure 1 at the end of this article, instream flow
As the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, & Parks explains current Montana law,
There is no flow level where new appropriations are no longer granted,
nor does it specifically matter the extent to which there are other rights on
the stream. If water can reasonably be expected to be available (even 1
in 10 years or less), a permit can be issued. The historic system, then,
encourages maximum diversion and use of water from Montana's
streams.
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF FISH, WILDLIFE, & PARKS, FISHERIES DIVISION, ANNUAL
PROGRESS REPORT: WATER LEASING STUDY 1999, at 2 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter 1999
WATER LEASING STUDY].
19 See Sterne, supra note 16, at 212 (noting Oregon's early efforts to preserve the "scenic
beauty" of streams in the Columbia River Gorge); Paul R. Williams & Stephen J. McHugh,
Water Marketing and Instream Flows: The Next Step in Protecting California's Instream
Values, 9 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 132, 144 (1990) (describing the California Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act and its deficiencies as a means of preserving instream flow).
20 See 1999 WATER LEASING STUDY, supra note 18, at 2 (describing Montana law); Sterne,
supra note 16, at 207-13 (describing Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington law);
Thomas, supra note 16, at 42-45 (describing California law).
21 See Sterne, supra note 16, at 207 (describing Washington law); Thomas, supra note 16,
at 15-16 (describing California law). But see Williams & McHugh, supra note 19, at 140-42
(discussing the weaknesses of such provisions as a means of protecting instream flows).
22 Thompson, supra note 7, at 485.
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acquisitions grew significantly during the 1990s.2" At the beginning of the
decade, governmental and private entities were annually acquiring less than
100,000 acre feet of water for instream flow throughout the western United
States. Acquisitions peaked in 1995 at more than 600,000 acre feet of
instrean flow acquisitions in eight western states.24 Since 1995, annual
acquisitions have remained relatively steady at slightly more than 500,000
acre-feet of water (with the exception of 1998 when acquisitions temporarily
declined to about 350,000 acre-feet).
A sense of the growing importance of the market for instream flow
can be gained by comparing commercial market transactions for surface
water rights with instream acquisitions. Instream acquisitions in 1999
exceeded commercial transfers in Arizona, New Mexico, and Oregon. In
Nevada, instream purchases returned to waterways almost half the amount of
water involved in commercial purchases. In California, which had a very
active water market, leases of water for instream flows protected about the
same quantity of water as agricultural and municipal interests leased-and
approximately 40 percent of the total quantity of water purchased or leased
for commercial purposes. Only in Colorado did instream acquisitions
constitute only a small fraction of total water transfers (and Colorado permits
only donations of water for instream purposes, severely restricting the
potential market for instream flows).
The federal government has been responsible for the bulk of instream
acquisitions. The Bureau of Reclamation has active and sizable programs to
acquire instream flow rights, principally in California's Central Valley,
Oregon's Klamath River Basin, and Washington's Yakima River Basin.25
The federal Fish & Wildlife Service also has acquired instream flows for its
wildlife refuges (most notably the Stillwater Wildlife Refuge in Nevada).26
With few exceptions, states have not adopted aggressive instream
acquisition programs. Colorado was the first state to actively solicit instream
rights, but its law prohibits the state to pay for the rights, making Colorado's
23 For an excellent discussion of instrearn acquisitions through 1997, see CLAY J. LANDRY,
SAVING OUR STREAMS THROUGH WATER MARKETS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1998), at http:l
www.perc.org/sos.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
24 The states in which governmental agencies or hen-profit organizations acquired instream
flow rights between 1995 and 1999 were Arizona, California, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. In research for this essay, I was unable to find
reports on any instream acquisitions in any of the other western states. See id. at 7.
25 See LANDRY, supra note 23, at 7-8, 26-27, 29 (summarizing the reclamation acquisition
programs).
26 See id. at 9, 31.
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program dependent entirely on donations of instream rights." Montana and
Nevada both have active instream acquisition programs, but their scales are
relatively small; 28 Arizona has established a fund to purchase water from the
federal Central Arizona Project that can then be used to help restore instream
flows; 29 New Mexico has perhaps the largest program for purchases of
instream rights, but only on the Pecos River and only because of its legal
obligation to ensure a specified instream flow under its interstate compact
with Texas.3"
The Oregon Water Trust is the oldest and most active private acquirer
of instream rights.3 Modeled after non-profit land trusts such as the Nature
Conservancy and the Trust for Public Lands, the Oregon Water Trust within
five years of its founding in 1994 built up a portfolio of over fifty instream
rights involving over thirty streams in eight basins.32 Recognizing its limited
funding, the Oregon Water Trust has focused on acquiring crucial flows in
smaller streams. According to two water specialists involved with the trust,
these flows "provide critical spawning and rearing habitat for anadromous
(migratory) and resident fish during the irrigation season."33 Since 1994,
environmental interests in other states have formed non-profits modeled after
the Oregon Water Trust. 4 National environmental organizations, such as the
Nature Conservancy and Trout Unlimited, have also entered the market on
a selective basis. Finally, a few private companies that benefit from instream
27 See id. at 5, 27-28. In some cases, however, nonprofits have purchased water rights and
then donated them to the Colorado instream program. See id. at 11 (noting donation of
water from the Conservation Trust).
2 8 Nevada's program is the larger, involving the purchase of over 6,000 acre-feet of water
at a cost of several million dollars. See id. at 5, 10. For a detailed description of Montana's
program, see MONTANA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL, MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF
FISH, WILDLIFE & PARKS' WATER LEASING STUDY: ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL
FINAL REPORT TO THE 5 6 T" LEGISLATURE (Nov. 1998) [hereinafter FINAL EQC REPORT].
29 See LANDRY, supra note 23, at 25.
30 See id. at 10, 30-31.
31 For a detailed description of the Oregon Water Trust and the Trust's experience in
acquiring instream water rights, see Janet C. Neuman & Cheyenne Chapman, Wading Into
the Water Market.- The First Five Years of the Oregon Water Trust, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LiG.
135 (1999). For additional information, see Oregon Water Trust, at http://www.owt.org (last
visited Oct. 27, 2000).
32 Neuman & Chapman, supra note 31, at 136. The flows total in excess of thirty cubic feet
per second. Id. at 149.
33 Id. at 149.
34 These entities include Great Basin Land and Water (based in Nevada) and the Washington
Water Trust. See LANDRY, supra note 23, at 11, 53, 55.
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flows, such as Trendwest Resorts, have acquired instream flow rights to
promote their commercial interests."
A. Governmental Acquisitions
1. Why acquisitions?
The government can provide a desired level of instream flow in a
variety of fashions other than through acquisition, including regulation and
condemnation. Why acquisition? Regulation avoids a drain on the public
fisc and is more consistent with the traditional view that water is a public
resource to which individuals should hold only limited, usufructuary rights
and only when consistent with the overall public interest. If the government
believes for policy or constitutional reasons that water users subject to
reduced diversions should be compensated, condemnation of the needed
water rights would provide adequate compensation. Market acquisitions run
the risk that water users will hold out for prices greater than the "market
value" of the water, raising the specter in some people's minds of unjust
enrichment. Voluntary acquisition would seem the inferior approach.
Political feasibility explains much of the reason for the government's
turn to voluntary acquisition.36 Existing water users have strongly and
successfully opposed efforts to return significant amounts of water to western
waterways. Legislatures and administrative agencies sometimes have
mustered the political courage to reserve unappropriated water for instream
purposes or to strip water users of unexercised paper rights. But legislatures
and agencies have balked at stripping users of water they are currently
using. 7 Virtually all of the major regulatory reallocations of water to the
environment have involved the judicial invocation of either the court-created
public trust doctrine" or the Endangered Species Act, which few, if any,
35 See MARGARET DELP, OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES: ACQUIRING AND PROTECTING
INSTREAM WATER RIGHTS IN WASHINGTON 37 (Washington Water Trust, May 1999) (on file
with the William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review) (discussing purchases
of water by Trendwest Resorts).
36See Neuman & Chapman, supra note 3 1, at 140 (noting that the "obvious solution" to the
"adamant resistance" to mandated instream flows is "simply to buy the water in order to
protect it").
37 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 16, at 25-32 (describing the reticence of California courts
and agencies to use the reasonable use doctrine to restore water to rivers).
38 Only California has applied the public trust doctrine to the restoration of instream flows.
See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert.
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members of the adopting Congress ever expected to interfere with
longstanding water uses." Even in these limited contexts, administrative
discretion and political opposition have combined to limit the law's potential
value in restoring instream flow.' The major exception to the dearth of
mandated reallocations are the reallocation provisions of the Central Valley
Project Improvement Act,4 whose implementation has been mired in
administrative squabbling and litigation for almost a decade.4 Legislative
efforts to reduce historic diversions, moreover, raise constitutional takings
questions.43
Political opposition is also high to condemnation of existing water
rights. Some opposition may stem from the fear that court-ordered
compensation will not reflect the true value of the water to the user. Although
users seems unlikely to attach a high idiosyncratic value to their water rights
(which is frequently the reason why compensation does not make a
condemnee whole), the high variability of water rights (in seniority,
geography, and reliability), combined with low numbers of comparable
market transactions, makes any effort to set a market price for water a highly
speculative endeavor." More importantly, because condemnation is
involuntary, many water users view condemnation as only a step removed
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (holding that the public trust doctrine limits Los Angeles'
diversions from Mono Lake); Thomas, supra note 16, at 36-40 (describing the application
of the public trust doctrine to instream flows in California and concluding that, given current
levels of discretion, the doctrine has limited value).
39 For an evaluation of several other limited legal tools available to return water to the stream
in California, see Thomas, supra note 16, at 15-19.
40 See Thomas, supra note 16, at 22-25, 38-40.
41 Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3406(b), 106 Stat. 4706,
4714-4721 (1992). For a description of the CVPIA provisions, see JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL.,
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 675-76 (3d ed. 2000); Harrison C. Dunning,
Confronting the Environmental Legacy of Irrlgated Agriculture in the West: The Case of the
Central Valley Project, 23 ENVTL. L. 943 (1993).
42 See, e.g., O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995).
43 For overviews of the takings issues raised by restrictions on water use (and from
somewhat different perspectives), see Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights, and
the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 257 (1990); Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Takings and Water Rights, in WATER LAW: TRENDS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 43 (Kathleen
Marion Carr & James D. Crammond eds., 1995). See also Williams & McHugh, supra note
19, at 157-158 (discussing possible takings challenges to the application of the public trust
doctrine to increase instream flows).
44 See, e.g., Neuman & Chapman, supra note 31, at 153-160 (1999) (discussing the
difficulties valuing water rights encountered by the Oregon Water Trust).
2000]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
from uncompensated regulation and thus as a dangerous precedent.
Voluntary acquisition programs themselves are not politically easy
sells. A 1989 proposal to establish a voluntary instream acquisition program
in Montana "created a public policy controversy seldom seen in the halls of
the [Montana] Capitol." '45 Although the legislature ultimately approved the
proposal by a narrow margin, opponents succeeded in closely circumscribing
the program-limiting acquisitions to short-term leases and to only five
stream stretches, requiring the approval of the state water board, and
providing for an automatic sunset after four years.46 When the program
proved less contentious in operation than it had on paper,47 the legislature
voted overwhelmingly to extend the life of the program, but the program
remains restricted to leases on a limited number of stream stretches.48
Any effort to reallocate water to instream flow, whether compulsory
or voluntary, raises concerns within the water community. Downstream
water users, for example, fear that reallocations will negatively affect the
timing of flows that are crucial to their operations.49 In the dry season,
farmers often depend on the return flow from earlier upstream irrigation; if
an upstream irrigator transfers his water to instream flow, the delayed return
flow upon which the downstream users rely will disappear. Agricultural
communities also fear that irrigators who transfer their water to instream flow
will fallow their lands, injuring the local economy. Water users also fear a
slippery policy slope. The legislative adoption of an instream acquisition
program endorses the importance of instream flows and undercuts the
traditional preference in western water law for consumptive uses; instream
acquisition programs thus undermine policy arguments against involuntary
instream reallocations.5" Finally, water users who anticipate needing more
water in the future may not want the added competition of the government
45 1999 WATER LEASING STUDY, supra note 18, at 2.
46 Act of May 11, 1989, ch. 658, Mont. Laws § 6.
47 See FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note 28, at A-15 (noting that instrean leasing has not
proven the "bogeyman it was first thought to be").
48 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-436 to 85-2-438 (1999). See 1999 WATER LEASING STUDY,
supra note 18, at 3 (noting overwhelming support for renewal of water leasing program).
For a history of the Montana instream leasing program and its authorizing legislation, see
FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note 28, at A-2 - A-8.
49 See FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note 28, at 10, B-3 (noting concerns regarding the effect
of instream transfers on return flow timing); Neuman & Chapman, supra note 31, at 164-65.
so See FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note 28, at A-6 (noting concern of agricultural community
that instrearn leases "would go against the traditional concept of water use, opening the door
for other changes in water use that would be unacceptable").
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bidding for instream flows; an instream acquisition program might bid up the
cost of water available on the market.5 Where the government acquires
water that otherwise might have gone unused, the acquisition might also take
water away from junior appropriators. Under prior appropriation law,
moreover, water that remains unused for a sufficient period of time is
"abandoned" or "forfeited" and becomes permanently available to other
appropriators.
None of these concerns are unique to a voluntary acquisition
program. On many "over appropriated" rivers, junior appropriators receive
water only because some seniors are not using their full rights. Any
reallocation of water from consumptive uses to instream flow, however
accomplished, raises concerns for downstream users and local communities.
By reducing the amount of water available for consumptive appropriation,
regulatory reallocations will also increase the price of any water available on
the market and make it less likely that junior appropriators will receive their
full appropriations. Voluntary acquisitions actually provide protections to
third parties that other forms of reallocations do not. Most states ban water
transfers that would injure other water users or negatively affect local
communities." Voluntary acquisitions might pose concerns to a nervous
water community, but they strike far less fear than instream mandates or
exercises of eminent domain.
Actual experience with voluntary instream acquisitions, moreover,
have not borne out the water community's initial fears. Virtually all
voluntary acquisitions have proceeded forward expeditiously without
opposition, and state water agencies have consistently found that proposed
acquisitions satisfy state standards protecting other appropriators, local
communities, and the public interest.53 Not surprisingly, opposition to
voluntary acquisition programs has declined over time as experience has
proven favorable.54 Even prior to such experience, legislatures were far more
5 A similar concern has led farmers within large irrigation districts, which often have active
internal water markets, to oppose permitting outside entities to bid for the water. See Barton
H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REv.
671, 736-37 (1993) (explaining that opposition to water transfers often may stem from
farmers' interest in preserving restricted markets and thus low water prices).
52 See, e.g., SAX ET AL., supra note 41, at 230-42 & 246-54.
53 See FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note 28, at A-5 -A-8 (describing the leases entered into
under the Montana instream leasing program); Neuman & Chapman, supra note 31, at 165
(noting that an objection has been filed to only one of the over fifty instrearn transfers
negotiated by the Oregon Water Trust).
54 See FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note 28, at 9 (Nov. 1999) (noting that instream leasing is
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receptive to voluntary acquisition programs than to mandated cutbacks.
The advantages of voluntary acquisition programs do not stop with
their comparative political expediency. Mandatory reallocation programs are
typically static. Water users may ultimately comply, after judicial challenges
and administrative foot dragging, but they have no incentive to go beyond
compliance and develop new conservation opportunities. By contrast,
voluntary acquisition programs in theory encourage users to develop new
conservation opportunities. If supply is sufficiently robust, users may well
compete for the limited purchase funds available by offering water at a lower
unit rate-increasing the amount of water that the government can acquire.
Users also may become supporters of greater funding for acquisitions,
aligning environmental and user support for increased instream flow."5
Voluntary acquisition programs are still too young and scattered to have
produced firm evidence that they lead to the development of significant new
conservation measures and to user support of instream funding, but in theory
the advantages could be substantial.
2. The Tension Between Acquisitions and Mandatory Reallocations
Some environmental advocates, nonetheless, have questioned the
political wisdom of using voluntary acquisition programs to increase instream
flows.56 Budgetary outlays for voluntary acquisitions have historically been
quite low," and political theory would suggest that legislative appropriations
are unlikely to fully reflect public support for instream acquisitions. Because
support for environmental amenities such as higher stream flow is relatively
diffuse, demands from more concentrated constituencies are likely to
"now more accepted, and even supported, by many of its former foes").
55 Taxes on water use, like voluntary acquisition programs, also provide a continuing
incentive to develop new conservation opportunities. Increased conservation translates to
lower taxes, but users are likely to oppose taxes vigorously.
56 Professor John Echeverria raised the issue in the discussion that followed my presentation
of this essay at the William and Mary symposium. He since has raised the issue in the
context of governmental support for land preservation. John Echeverria, What Would Aldo
Leopold Say?, at http://www.tompaine.com/opinion/2000/05/11/1.html (last visited Oct. 27,
2000).
57 See, e.g., FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note 28, at A-14 (noting that annual appropriations
for the Montana leasing program began in FY 1990 at $40,000 and, after rising as high as
$55,000 in the mid-1990s, has since declined to only $33,000). As of 1997, neither the
Oregon nor Washington legislatures had ever appropriated any money for instream
acquisitions even though state law authorized acquisitions by state agencies. Sterne, supra
note 16, at 208, 216.
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dominate the appropriation process. Although some instream acquisition
programs have gotten around the appropriation process by funding
acquisitions through a fee on water use," water users are likely to oppose
such fees as strongly and effectively as they have opposed mandated instream
flows. Many water users, moreover, have refused to participate in instream
acquisition programs either out of lingering suspicions that the programs are
regulations in disguise or because of local community opposition to water
transfers.59 For these reasons, voluntary acquisition programs may never
provide levels of instream flow reflective of the actual public demand for
stream restoration.60
None of this would argue against voluntary acquisition programs if
they did not reduce the chances of increasing instream flows through other
means. Instream proponents could enjoy the limited fruit of voluntary
acquisitions while pursuing other avenues of restoration. But by paying some
water users for instream flows, the government may undercut the argument
for direct regulation. Opponents of regulation are likely to point to the
voluntary acquisition program as evidence that mandated reallocations are
unfair and unnecessary. While mandatory reallocations may be a tough
political sell, some environmentalists would prefer that fight over under-
funded acquisition programs that give regulatory opponents yet another
argument against mandatory reallocations.
Some environmental advocates, moreover, fear that, by paying for
instream flow, the government also may undercut an ethos of conservation.
Aldo Leopold believed that the only effective means to achieve sustainable
resource use was by developing a new norm, a "land ethic," under which
property owners would incorporate the needs of the ecosystem as a whole
into their stewardship of land, water, and other resources. 6' Several recent
58 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 16, at 51 (describing the fee system under the Central Valley
Project Improvement Act).
59 See, e.g., FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note 28, at A-6 (observing that some potential lessors
were scared off by perceived community opposition); Neuman & Chapman, supra note 31,
at 169.
60 See FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note 28, at 9 (concluding that instream leases will never
"solve all of Montana's stream dewatering problems, because of; (1) the complexity of
obtaining leases, (2) the small quantities of water that are usually involved, and (3) the
potential effects on existing water users"). Cf Echeverria, supra note 56 (quoting Aldo
Leopold for the proposition that public acquisition of environmentally sensitive land "can
cover only a fraction of what needs to be done, and then only awkwardly, expensively, and
with frequent clashes of interest").
61 ALDO LEOPOLD, SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 217-241 (1949).
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scholars, in turn, have suggested that legal regulations or standards may
encourage the development of new norms consistent with those regulations
or standards.62 Some have worried that government acquisition programs, by
contrast, might undermine the fostering of a new land ethic by making
environmental stewardship an issue of money rather than fundamental
values. 3
These issues are ultimately empirical and, unfortunately, we currently
have no studies that shed reliable light on the interactions of government
regulations, voluntary acquisitions, and norms. Experience suggests that
voluntary acquisitions need not be inconsistent with mandatory reallocations.
Normative and political support for mandatory reallocations vary. Where the
need for instream flows is particularly acute (e.g., where crucial to
endangered fish species) and water users can readily reduce their use, a strong
argument can be made for mandated reductions. Legislative reductions will
prove more difficult where needs are less acute or reductions more expensive
to water users. Governments can turn to voluntary acquisitions in the latter
situations without undermining the argument for mandatory reductions in the
former. The Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) takes this
approach, mandating reallocations in excess of 800,000 acre feet of water
while authorizing voluntary acquisitions of several hundred thousands of acre
feet more.'
Both theory and experience, moreover, suggest that instream
advocates stand a better chance of increasing funding for acquisition
programs than mandating significant reductions in existing withdrawals.
Regulatory efforts must overcome the concerted opposition of agriculture and
other water users, who still wield considerable political power. At least
during periods of growing governmental revenue, increasing the
appropriations for acquisition programs should prove a far easier political
task. In recent years, moreover, voters in a number of states have approved
bond issues for the acquisition of water and sensitive lands, demonstrating
62 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024-
25 (1996) (suggesting the potential influence of laws on societal norms of behavior); Cass
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 913 (1996).
63 See Echeverria, supra note 56 (worrying that government acquisition might "undermine,
rather than reinforce, the land ethic").
64 See Ernest A. Conant, The Central Valley Project Improvement Act Proposed Reforms,
6 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REv. 27, 27-30 (1996) (describing the instream flow provisions
of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act); Harrison C. Dunning, Confronting the
Environmental Legacy of Irrigated Agriculture in the West: The Case of the Central Valley
Project, 23 ENVTL. L. 943, 960-963 (1993) (same).
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strong political support for such environmental expenditures.6" As noted
earlier, water users themselves may come to support increased funding if
voluntary acquisition programs serve as an enticing reward for conservation.
By contrast, legislative efforts to reduce existing withdrawals have been
almost singularly unsuccessful.
How different methods of increasing instream flow may affect norms
of water usage is highly speculative. Voluntary acquisition programs seem
unlikely to develop independent conservation norms; why voluntarily return
to the river what one can sell to the government? But there is no evidence
that mandatory reallocations, particularly when strongly opposed by water
users, will generate new conservation norms. Nor does it seem likely that
new norms will result in significant reductions in withdrawals. Domestic
water consumers sometimes have voluntarily reduced their water use in
response to droughts or other unavoidable limitations in the water supply, but
the reductions have generally proven only temporary.' When the drought or
shortage ends, consumers return to prior consumption practices. Experience
suggests that people may internalize environmental norms that are easy to
meet, particularly when the norms have high symbolic value-such as
recycling norms." But this is a far cry from expecting that farmers and other
users of large quantities of water will voluntarily implement often expensive
conservation measures to increase instream flow. Failure to inculcate
conservation norms in other high-cost areas suggest that economic self-
interest will prevail.6
The potential tension between voluntary acquisition and mandatory
conservation, it should be noted, can work both ways. In some cases,
regulatory threats can encourage water users to participate in voluntary
65 See Williams & McHugh, supra note 19, at 192-96 (discussing the various interest groups
benefitted by instream flows).
66 See Henry J. Vaux, Jr., Growth and Water in the South Coast Basin of California, in
WATER AND ARID LANDS OF THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 233, 263 (Mohamed E1-Ashry
& Diane Gibbons eds., 1988) (concluding that "[r]ationing to manage demand is probably
effective only for short periods when there is a commonly perceived water-supply deficit");
see also JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 690 (1991)
(suggesting the same, but also noting exceptions).
67 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 906-07
(1996) (discussing recycling norms); see also Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms (2000)
(unpublished manuscript available at http://papers.ssm.com) (same).
68 For a brief discussion of the problems involved in changing environmental behavior
through the encouragement of norms, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The
Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 267-69 (2000).
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acquisition programs; if the water users do not sell, they face the risk of
regulation.69 But just as voluntary acquisitions in theory could undermine
political support for mandatory regimes, regulatory efforts can undermine
voluntary acquisitions.7 ° To participate in voluntary acquisition programs,
water users must come forward with conservation opportunities. This is one
of the advantages of voluntary acquisition programs over regulatory
reallocations which, as noted earlier, encourage water users to conceal
conservation opportunities and overstate the real cost of conservation.
Voluntary acquisition programs reward development and disclosure of
conservation opportunities. If there is a significant chance that the
government will use information gleaned from voluntary acquisition
programs to regulate current water use, however, water users may hesitate to
participate in a voluntary acquisition program for fear the information will be
used to support a mandatory reallocation.
Governments thus must walk a careful balance between mandatory
reallocations and voluntary acquisitions if they wish to obtain the advantages
of each. If voluntary acquisition becomes the norm or expectation,
mandatory reallocation will become even more difficult to enact; excessive
regulatory zeal may scare water users away from participating in voluntary
acquisition programs. A careful balancing of the two, however, can ensure
a higher level of instream flow than either pure regulation or voluntary
acquisitions can provide, as well as a more cost effective and equitable
reallocation.
3. Designing an Acquisition Program
The creation of an instream flow market presents a number of
institutional or design issues. Several of the issues stem from the novelty of
instream flow rights within the prior appropriation system. In some
important respects, instream flow rights are radically different from
consumptive rights and thus require modifying or rethinking existing state
69 See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights, and the Future of Water Law,
61 U. COLO. L. REv. 257, 278 (1990) (arguing, in connection with water markets, that
governments must "keep waste enforcement at the ready" to "induce 'voluntary'
conservation and sale").
70 For an explanation of how regulatory efforts can undermine voluntary acquisitions in the
context of commercial water markets, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Law as a
Pragmatic Exercise: Professor Joseph Sax's Water Scholarship, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 378
(1998) (noting that "[e]ntities with unmet water needs may hesitate to pay for water if there
is a chance they can use the regulatory system to get the water for free").
280 [Vol.25:261
MARKETS FOR NATURE
water law. Start with the manner in which an instream flow right must be
defined. Consumptive water rights historically have been defined based on
a "point of diversion": water users are entitled to withdraw a set quantity of
water at a particular point on the river and can "call" upstream junior
appropriators whose diversions interfere with this entitlement; any water not
consumed that finds its way back to the river can be withdrawn and used by
downstream water users. Flow rights necessarily involve an additional
physical dimension and thus require a new definition. The flow right could
extend along a limited and specified stretch of river or to the entire length of
the river downstream from the point at which the water used to be diverted.
In theory, the governmental purchaser should receive a right to an instream
flow that extends the entire length of the river from the old point of diversion
because any water that was previously consumed reduced the entire
downstream flow of water.7 If the flow right extends a considerable length
of the river, however, the quantity of the flow right at any particular point
along that length should reflect the natural loss of water from the river due
either to seepage or evaporation; otherwise, the right could interfere with the
diversion rights of downstream appropriators. Calculation of such flow loss,
however, is likely to be complex and controversial. Rough approximations
often will be needed.72
71 Defining the right is even more complicated than the text suggests. Offstream water users
generally consume a percentage of the water they divert, with a portion of the remainder
often finding its way back into the stream and being used by downstream appropriators.
Assume that a particular offstream user has historically diverted 10 cubic feet per second
(cfs) of water and consumed 6 cfs, with 4 cfs returning to the river and being diverted 1 mile
downstream by another user. As suggested in the text, if the water right is purchased for
instrearn flow by a governmental agency, the agency arguably should have a flow right to
6 cfs extending downstream to the mouth of the river. Should the agency also have the right,
however, to an additional 4 cfs along the stretch from the old point of diversion downstream
one mile to the other appropriator's diversion? Although it might be tempting to award such
a right, downstream users enjoy the right to change their point of diversion. The agency
therefore should be given an additional 4 cfs flow right only between the old point of
diversion and the point at which the water historically returned to the river and thus was
available for reappropriation; this latter point, however, may not be easy to determine.
72 The Oregon Water Resources Department is one of the few state agencies to have
addressed the question. Its administrative regulations provide:
Normally, a new instream water right shall be maintained downstream to
the mouth of the affected stream; however, it may be maintained farther
downstream if the amount of the instream water right is a measurable
portion of the flow in the receiving stream or for a point or shorter
distance if needed to account for return flow or to prevent injury.
OR. ADMIN. R. 690-077-0015 (1995). See also Neuman & Chapman, supra note
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Another critical definitional question is how the instream right should
relate to mandated flow requirements. Instream acquisitions should not count
toward mandated flow requirements on any stretch of the waterway;
otherwise, the acquisition would simply free up junior appropriators to divert
more from the waterway.73 If state law requires a flow of X cubic feet per
second (cfs) of water through a particular river stretch, acquisition of Y cfs
should not count toward the X cfs requirement but should result in a stream
flow of X + Y cfs. To ensure that acquisitions are additive, however, states
will generally need to modify their existing laws.74 An interesting legal
question is whether a state can constitutionally provide that any acquisition
does not count toward federal instream requirements. Where federal law
permits states to set higher standards, as under the Endangered Species Act,
any such state provision would arguably fall within the federal non-
preemption provision and not constitute an unconstitutional attempt to
directly modify federal law. Where federal law such as the Federal Power
Act preempts state efforts to set both lower and higher instream flow
requirements,75 however, such a state provision may well be illegal.76
Congressional action thus might also be needed.77
31, at 166 (observing that this provision generally "allows in-stream flows to be
protected to the mouth of the stream").
73 See Thomas, supra note 16, at 48-51 (describing the need for such a provision and the
history of the early unsuccessful efforts to pass such a provision in California); Delp, supra
note 35, at 47-48 (discussing the issue in connection with Washington law).
74 To date, California is the only state to have addressed the issue. Under § 1707(c) of the
California Water Code, the state water board, on the request of someone petitioning to
change a consumptive water right to an instream right,
may specify, as part of its approval of the petition, that the water.., shall
be in addition to water that is required, if any, to be used for instream
purposes to satisfy any applicable federal, state, or local regulatory
requirements governing water quantity, water quality, instream flows, fish
and wildlife, wetlands, recreation, and other instrearn beneficial uses. If
the request is approved by the board, state and local agencies, as well as
the courts, shall not credit the water subject to that petition towards
compliance with any of the regulatory requirements described in this
subdivision.
CAL. WATER CODE § 1707 (C) (1998). The decision whether to make acquisitions
additive, however, is in the discretion of the state water board. Id.
75 See California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490 (1990) (holding that states cannot set higher
instrearn flow requirements for hydroelectric projects than the Federal Energy Regulatory
Comniission).
76 See Thomas, supra note 16, at 49 n.217.
77 California, which as noted is the only state to date to have considered the interrelationship
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A separate issue rising from the unique nature of instream flow rights
is how to ensure effective enforcement of such rights. The solution might
seem simple: the government should monitor streamflows and police against
illegal diversions of its instream rights. Most states today, however, do not
continually monitor most streams, and most state agencies do not have
sizable enforcement staffs, leaving enforcement of private water rights up to
the right-holders themselves.78 Of more importance, the watermasters in
charge of rivers often have proven uncooperative, at least initially, in
enforcing instream flow rights. Unfamiliar with the concept of instream
rights, watermasters often have allocated any available instream flow to
consumptive users with unmet needs.79 Some governmental agencies also
have found it politically difficult to seek enforcement of instream flow rights
during drought periods when the instream flows are most needed, but when
cities and farmers are also frantic for water.80 Effective enforcement of
instream flow rights therefore may require active education of watermasters,
offstream water right holders, and the general public, as well as additional
of instream acquisitions and regulatory requirements, finesses the issue by leaving it up to
the federal government whether to require regulatory water on top of the instream flow
requirement. Thus, section 1707(c), discussed supra in footnote 74, provides that a "federal
agency shall comply with the requirement [that acquisitions not be counted toward
regulatory requirements] to the extent required by federal law, or to the extent that it chooses
to comply."
78 See Delp, supra note 35, at 56 (discussing the lack of monitoring and enforcement staff
in Washington); Sterne, supra note 16, at 216-17 (discussing the problem of lack of
enforcement staff in Oregon and elsewhere and also suggesting possible conflicts of interest
where enforcement is performed by agencies responsible for allocating water among
consumptive users).
79 See, e.g., FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note 28, at A-10 - A-1I (noting problems in getting
water commissioners initially to enforce instream rights). See also Sterne, supra note 16,
at 217 (suggesting that watermasters might be more receptive to the concerns of
consumptive water users because such users usually pay some or all of the salary of the
watermasters).
80 In 1988, for example, a small subdivision objected when the Montana Department of Fish,
Wildlife, and Parks (FWP) tried to enforce an instream right-even though the subdivision
had obtained its appropriative right after the instream right was established and knew that
its consumptive right was inferior. A local newspaper headlined that the FWP was "taking
away the drinking water" of local citizens. Despite its superior legal right, the FWP did not
end up insisting that the subdivision reduce its diversions. At one meeting, a local politician
opined that "Montana citizens have a constitutional right to water for drinking and hygiene
purposes and FWP shouldn't be interfering with that right." Liter Spence, Improving
Instream Flow Protection in Montana 12 (Apr. 1997) (unpublished briefing paper prepared
for the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, on file with the William and Mary
Environmental Law and Policy Review).
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funding for monitoring of instream flows.8 '
Beyond the issues stemming from the novel nature of instream flow
rights, a government interested in establishing an instream acquisition
program must also think about whether there are mechanisms by which the
government can ensure that the acquisition program goes toward producing
new instream flow rather than simply rewarding water users who would have
reduced their diversions in any case. A voluntary acquisition program will
attract the attention not only of water users who otherwise would continue to
divert water as before but also of water users who were already planning to
install new conservation equipment (because it is economically profitable to
conserve even without selling the conserved water) or to otherwise reduce
their water use (perhaps because their farming operations are losing money).
Some of these water users may have other marketing opportunities (e.g.,
selling or leasing water to a municipality); many will not. Where the water
users do not have other marketing opportunities, the government would be
paying for water that would be returned to the river in any case for free." In
an ideal world, the government could distinguish between water users, paying
only those who otherwise would have continued using water. If the
government announced such a rule, however, few water users are likely to
admit that they plan to reduce their water use voluntarily.
Although governments cannot eliminate this problem, they may be
able to minimize the problem through a reverse auction system. The
government would invite all water users to submit their best (i.e., least cost)
bid for the provision of instream flow. The government would then accept
bids in the order that is most advantageous to the government, factoring in
both the cost and the environmental benefit of the water; assuming that all
water would furnish a similar environmental benefit, the government would
accept the lowest bids first. If government funding is constrained, a reverse
auction system would drive down the price that water users demand.
Someone who is planning to reduce water use in any case and has no other
market for their water would be driven down toward a price of zero, the
effective value of the water that they are offering to sell. By forcing potential
81 Cf FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note 28, at A- 11 (observing that education of water
commissioners is effective in increasing cooperation in enforcement of instream rights);
1999 WATER LEASING STUDY, supra note 18, at 11 (noting success of educational efforts,
but also pointing out room for improvement).
82 If the water were returned to the river rather than sold to the government for instream
flow, the water might be appropriable by someone else. But if this were a concern, the




sellers to be more honest in their asking prices, a reverse auction system
would also address another problem: the difficulty of measuring the value of
water rights. Unlike widgets, water rights each have a unique value varying
by the right's location and seniority, and the lack of extremely active water
markets in much of the West means that "comparables" often are not
available.3
A final set of issues concerns whether and how to structure an
instream acquisition program to address concerns of local water communities.
A state that is concerned about the potential effect of instream flow
acquisitions on the economic health of agricultural communities, for
example, might choose to limit acquisitions to water that is freed up through
conservation or other salvage operations, rather than fallowing of fields.
Although there is no legal limitation in Montana law, community sensitivity
has led Montana's instream acquisition program to focus almost entirely on
conserved water.84 States also might choose to limit acquisitions to leases,
either to provide time to evaluate the impact of an instream acquisition
program on water users and local communities or to ensure local
communities that any loss of water for local economic use will be only
temporary. Montana, as noted earlier, limits its instream program to leases,
initially capping the length of leases at four years. 5 Any effort to meet the
concerns of local communities, however, risks undermining the effectiveness
of the instream acquisition program. Because the financial life of many
conservation programs is thirty years, for example, programs that are limited
to only short-term leases are unlikely to encourage critical conservation
measures.86 As a result, Montana's legislature has repeatedly increased the
lease terms permitted under the state's instream acquisition program, until
today leases involving "salvage" water are authorized for up to thirty years8
Efforts to meet community concerns thus must be carefully balanced against
the incentive effect on conservation.
83 See Neunan & Chapman, supra note 31, at 160-67 (discussing the scientific uncertainty
regarding the benefits of particular instream flow).
84 See FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note 28, at A-6 - A-8 (summarizing Montana's instream
leases).
85 1989 Mont. Laws 658, § 6.
86 See FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note 28, at 10-11 (noting the need to lengthen leases to
thirty years).
87 See id. at A-3; 1999 WATER LEASING STUDY, supra note 18, at 3.
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B. Private Acquisition of Instream Rights
1. Authorization of Private Acquisitions
Individual citizens may favor a higher level of instream flows than
the government chooses to provide. The government will provide the level
of instream flow preferred by the median voter--or, given the political bias
against goods desired by a diffuse segment of society, an even lower level.88
Where the law permits private individuals or entities to acquire instream
flows, those individuals who prefer a higher level of instream flows are not
limited by the government's choice. Such individuals can arrange for a
higher aggregate level of instream flows or provide for increased flows in
individual waterways.89 Except in the unlikely circumstance that a higher
level of instream flow is injurious, the opportunity for private acquisitions of
instream flows will increase societal welfare. Those who prefer a higher
level than the government provides can increase their satisfaction by
contributing to private acquisitions; those who are happy with the
government level need not contribute. Like competitive options in the
marketplace, the option to acquire a higher level increases overall consumer
satisfaction.
Opening up instream flow markets to entities other than the
government also carries a variety of related advantages. Scientists, for
example, may disagree on the levels of instream flows needed during various
seasons to protect particular fish species. Private acquisitions permit those
scientists who believe that the governmental level of instream flow is
inadequate to shop their views to other concerned entities. In protecting
instream flows, private entities can also take innovative approaches that the
government may have rejected or missed. The Oregon Water Trust, for
example, has taken the inventive approach of providing some ranchers with
food for their cattle in return for the water that the ranchers had been using
to grow hay or alfalfa."
Non-profit water trusts, like land trusts, also can play a useful
brokerage role for the government. The government may not be in a position
88 Cf. Sterne, supra note 16, at 218-19 (noting the political pressure that is sometimes
brought against governmental acquisitions of instream rights).
89 The Oregon Water Trust, for example, has supplemented the federal government's focus
on large waterways by acquiring smaller amounts of instream flow on smaller streams. See
LANDRY, supra note 23, at 17.
90 Neuman & Chapman, supra note 31, at 146 - 148.
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to acquire water rights that are on the market because it currently does not
have the necessary appropriations. Water trusts can acquire water when it
comes on the market and then resell it to the government when public funds
become available. Similarly, water trusts often have better contacts in the
water user community (and thus hear of more opportunities when they arise)
and can acquire water from individuals who are hesitant or resistant to
working with the government.9 Non-profit water trusts also are not burdened
by the lengthy review process that most governmental agencies must go
through before acquiring instream rights and therefore water trusts often can
act faster on market opportunities, acquiring available water before
consumptive users do.92
Yet only a handful of states explicitly authorize private acquisitions."
Montana authorizes private individuals and entities of any kind to lease water
for up to ten years for instream purposes.94 Oregon permits "any person" to
acquire an instream right by purchase, lease, or donation.9" Precedent also
exists in Washington for private instream acquisitions.96 California permits
anyone, including implicitly the private purchaser of a water right, to dedicate
some or all of their water to "preserving or enhancing wetlands habitat, fish
and wildlife resources, or recreation in, or on, the water. 9 7 The law in
several other states can be read to permit private acquisitions of instream
rights, although neither administrative agencies nor courts have yet addressed
91 Sterne, supra note 16, at 212. But see Neuman & Chapman, supra note 31, at 169 (citing
a study showing that water right holder antipathy toward selling directly to the government
was not as widely held an attitude as expected).
92 Sterne, supra note 16, at 218.
93 Private entities may also be able to acquire instream flow rights in other states, but the law
does not provide explicit authorization, and the question is therefore open to potential
litigation. See, e.g., Delp, supra note 35, at 13-14 (discussing the legal issues involved in
the potential acquisition of instream rights by water trusts in the state of Washington).
94 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-407 - 85-2-409 (1995). A separate provision of Montana law
authorizes private and public entities to lease water up to ten years to enhance stream flows
in the Upper Clark Fork River basin. Id. §§ 85-2-439 - 85-2-440. Montana law also allows
water users to temporarily change the use of their water rights to instream flow without
leasing the water to a separate entity. Id. § 85-2-408.
95 OR. REv. STAT. § 537.348(1) (1987).
96 James D. Crammond, Leasing Water Rights for Instream Flow Uses: A Survey of Water
Transfer Policy, Practices, and Problems in the Pacific Northwest, 26 ENVTL. L. 225, 227
(1996) (citing Bevan v. DOE Pollution Control Hearings Bd. No. 48 (1972)).
9 7 CAL. WATER CODE § 1707 (1999). See Thomas, supra note 16, at 47-48 (discussing the
implementation of this provision of California law).
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the question.9" Where bills have been proposed in these states to explicitly
authorize private acquisitions, however, the legislatures have rejected them."
Even existing programs in states like Montana and Oregon were not easy to
legislate and, in some cases, have faced repeated efforts to repeal the
authorizing legislation."
Why have only a limited number of states authorized the private
acquisition of instream flow-and then only reluctantly? Some observers
have suggested that legislatures may view instream flows as uniquely public
in character, reflecting collective decisions about the commonweal."0 '
Although governments must be involved in the provision of instream flows,
however, there is no reason why governments must monopolize the field.
Instream flows are largely public goods: the benefits of instream flows are
nonexclusive, and one person can enjoy the benefits without taking away
from someone else's enjoyment of them. 2 As a result, nonprofits and
private organizations cannot be counted on to provide a level of instream
flows that maximizes societal benefits (not to mention the potential
nonutilitarian benefits of instream flows); although some individuals will
98 See, e.g., Sterne, supra note 16, at 209-10, 227-28 (noting the uncertainty in Arizona and
Idaho law regarding private appropriations of instream flows). Alaska and Nevada also both
explicitly define "beneficial uses" to include some environmental purposes (ALASKA STAT.
§ 46.15.260(3) (Michie 1987); State v. Morros, 766 P.2d 263 (Nev. 1988), but the question
remains open whether that permits private individuals or nonprofits to acquire water for
environmental uses.
99 See Sterne, supra note 16, at 227-28 (noting rejection of acquisition legislation proposed
in Arizona). Cf id. at 210 (noting legislative rejection in Idaho on two occasions of bills
authorizing simply donations of instrearn rights to the government).
100 See Neuman & Chapman, supra note 31, at 177-78 (describing efforts at repeal in every
Oregon legislative session between 1995 and 1999, one of which passed the house of the
state legislature); Sterne, supra note 16, at 211-12 (describing initial agricultural and
development opposition to private acquisition legislation in Montana). Cf Sterne, supra
note 16, at 222-31 (describing general opposition of existing water users to private instream
acquisition legislation).
101 See, e.g., Neuman & Chapman, supra note 31, at 170-71 (raising, and rebutting the
argument, as grounds for requiring that any instrearn flow right be held by the state rather
than a nonprofit organization).
102 There are exceptions to this generalization. Laws could privatize the recreational or
transportation benefits of instream stretches, and if too many people began to play in streams
or use them for navigation, that could ultimately undercut the benefits to others. But this
does not undercut the primary character of instream flows as public goods. See Carol Rose,
The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 711, 768 (1986) (observing that the benefits of some forms of common
property, such as instream flows, might actually increase as more people use the commons).
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contribute -toward instream flows, many others will free ride on the
contributions of others. This is an argument for public provision of instream
flow, but it does not justify banning those who wish even greater levels of
instream flows from using the marketplace to achieve those levels-any more
than the public character of education or welfare justifies banning their
provision by nonprofits or other private entities.
The legal nonreceptivity to private instream acquisitions found in
most states is, more likely, a vestige of the historic prohibition of private
instream flow rights in the West. To appropriate water in the West, you
traditionally needed to divert water for a reasonable and beneficial use (which
did not generally encompass environmental, recreational, or aesthetic uses),
thus precluding instream appropriations." 3 Although a growing number of
states now authorize specifically enumerated public agencies to appropriate
new instream flows, the historic ban on private instream appropriations
remains uniformly in place. One reason is political. Agricultural interests
and other water users worry that, if instream appropriations were permitted,
private environmental groups could seek to appropriate all remaining
unappropriated waters, potentially foreclosing any new appropriations for
consumptive uses." (The water community worries less about governmental
appropriations over which water users enjoy some political leverage). Part
of the reason may also be a legitimate fear that private individuals could
appropriate instream flow for speculative reasons, preserving the water in the
river only until a good marketing opportunity comes along."0 5 Such
speculation is antithetical to the prior appropriation system, which
historically has sought to ensure that unutilized water is available free of
charge to anyone seeking to put it to a reasonable and beneficial offstream
use.
Similar but somewhat weaker concerns likely motivate opposition to
private instream acquisitions. Private instream acquisitions cannot tie up
what little unappropriated water remains in the West's waterways because
acquisitions are limited to currently consumed water. But private instream
acquisitions (like public instream acquisitions) increase market demand for
existing water rights and thus potentially increase the market price of water
that other water users might wish to purchase. In addition, private
acquisitions might tie up water that would otherwise be forfeited, abandoned,
103 Thomas, supra note 16, at 13-15.
104 See Delp, supra note 35, at 80-81 (discussing the traditional opposition to private
instrearn rights from agricultural organizations and other water users).
105 Sterne, supra note 16, at 230-3 1.
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or left unused to satisfy junior consumptive needs. In public debates, these
concerns often get swept up into a more general concern that private instream
rights would give environmentalists "too much power in water
distribution."'' 6 If private acquisitions were permitted, moreover, someone
wishing to acquire water rights for purely speculative purposes could
purchase water rights and hold them as instream flow until an acceptable
future offer to purchase came along.° 7 Under traditional prior appropriation
doctrine, water rights can be transferred only to someone with an immediate
beneficial use for the water, precluding such speculative acquisitions.
These concerns do not justify limiting instream acquisitions to the
public sector. If the concerns over market competition are any different in
the private rather than public context, it is because of a fear that private
entities will not be as responsive to the needs of consumptive users as a
public agency.'08 Even if this is problematic rather than beneficial,'0 9 any
private instream acquisitions will involve a change in the appropriations'
purpose and thus require approval of the state water agency. Most western
states now require their water agencies to determine whether the change is in
the overall public interest, which should include consideration of alternative
consumptive uses of the water."10 Most states that authorize private instream
acquisitions also require the acquirer to show that the requested amount of
water is needed for fish or wildlife purposes."' If the standards for public
interest evaluation are inadequate, the standards can be easily supplemented.
Public interest evaluations, however, should keep in mind that the very value
106 Neuman & Chapman, supra note 31, at 169 (quoting Janelle L. Schmidt, Instrean Water
Rights in Oregon: To Hold or Not to Hold? 39 (1995) (unpublished M.P.P. thesis, Harvard
University) (on file with the Harvard University Library)).
'
0 7 See DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOw PROTECTION: SEEKING
A BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE (1997).
108 See FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note 28, at C-Il (noting concern "that some people with
a lot of money may not be as benevolent" as a state agency).
109 The question is whether the public interest calls for special protection for some market
segments. Given the traditional bias in western water law in favor of consumption, it seems
hard to argue that the government should protect water consumers from market competition
from private organizations seeking water for environmental purposes.
110 See SAX ET AL., supra note 41, at 246-54.
I MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-408(3)(b) (1995) (requiring instream lessors to show that the
requested amount of water is needed to benefit fishery resources). See also CAL. WATER
CODE § 1707(b) (1999) (water board must find that dedication of water for instream




of private acquisitions is in permitting private individuals to disagree with
state determinations of the need for instream flows. The adoption of
numerous and complex safeguards may also make the instream acquisition
process prohibitively expensive or time consuming." 2
Administrative reviews of proposed changes in appropriation permits
also provide some protection against entrepreneurs using private instream
flow authorization to engage in speculative water acquisitions. Indeed,
nonprofit preservation organizations have acquired virtually all of the
instream flow rights to date in those states authorizing private acquisitions,
and there is no evidence of speculative purchases. If states were concerned
with such problems, however, several approaches could be taken. States
could permit only non-profit organizations to acquire instream flows, thus
precluding personal profitmaking from a later commercial sale of instream
rights'. Or states could require that any private entity acquiring a water right
dedicate the right to the state, which would then hold and control the rights.
The Oregon state water agency initially argued that any instream right
acquired by the Oregon Water Trust had to be dedicated to the state, but later
backed away from the position.'13
2. Government Subsidization of Private Instream Acquisitions
Should governments not only authorize private instream acquisitions,
but also subsidize such acquisitions? The government already subsidizes
acquisitions of land and conservation easements by nonprofit land trusts such
as the Nature Conservancy and the Trust for Public Lands. When someone
contributes money to a nonprofit land trust, the federal government provides
the contributor with a tax deduction which, depending on whether the
contributor itemizes his taxes, the contributor's tax bracket, and various other
computational rules, can provide an effective subsidy equal to almost forty
112 Cf FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note 28, at B-2 (noting testimony by Montana Trout
Unlimited representative that Montana review process must be streamlined to be more cost
effective).
113 See Neuman & Chapman, supra note 31, at 167-171 (also suggesting that the Oregon
water agency took this approach because of the belief that instream flows are uniquely
public in character); Sterne, supra note 16, at 213 (describing the original Oregon position).
A similar proposal has been made in Montana to require private parties to transfer any
instream right to the Department of Fish, Wildlife & Parks. FINAL EQC REPORT, supra note
28, at C- 11. In Oregon, the Water Resources Department later decided to permit the Oregon
Water Trust to hold a "flow augmentation" right in the trust's own name. Neuman &
Chapman, supra note 31, at 170.
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percent of the contribution; " 4 states provide an additional subsidy through
state tax deductions." 5 If someone offers to donate their land or a
conservation easement to a nonprofit land trust, federal and state
governments provide a similar subsidy through a tax deduction equal to the
value of the property interest." 6 The federal government also gives
preferential estate tax treatment to land in which conservation easements have
been donated to a nonprofit organization." 7
Several arguments combine into a relatively strong justification for
providing tax subsidies of both land and water preservation (although not
necessarily for the specific level of subsidy provided through the tax
provisions). First, subsidization of nonprofit efforts can achieve a higher
level of preservation than if the funds were invested in public acquisitions.
At the current federal tax level, providing a tax deduction attracts more in
contributions than the government loses in tax payments." 8 The government
thus can leverage its limited funds to preserve more land and water. Second,
contributions to nonprofit environmental trusts reflects an unmet demand for
preservation beyond that provided directly by the government. Because of
collective action difficulties, however, contributions only reflect a portion of
the actual demand for additional preservation. Many individuals who value
additional preservation do not contribute to environmental trusts but instead
attempt to free ride on the contributions of others. Tax incentives can be seen
as a means of correcting for the sub-optimal level of contributions by
encouraging a higher level of contributions through governmental
supplementation.
For reasons that were probably unintentional, however, tax incentives
for water trusts are not as clear cut as those for land trusts. Federal tax laws
provide the same incentive to someone making a monetary contribution to a
nonprofit water trust as to a land trust. Someone contemplating donating
114 I.R.C. § 170 (1994).
15 See generally Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 387, 431 (1998)
(noting the availability of charitable deductions under state tax laws).
116 I.R.C. § 170 (1994).
117 See generally Karen M. White, "Extra" Tax Benefits for Conservation Easements: A
Response to Urban Sprawl, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 103 (1999) (discussing estate tax laws);
Stephanie L. Sandre, Conservation Easements: Minimizing Taxes and Maximizing Land, 4
DRAKE. J. AGRIC. L. 357 (1999) (discussing the general tax benefits from the creation of
conservation easements).
118 The price elasticity of charitable deductions, in more technical terms, is greater than one.
See Todd Izzo, A Full Spectrum of Light: Rethinking the Charitable Contribution Deduction,
141 U. PA. L. REv. 2371, 2385-86 (1993).
292 [Vol.25:261
MARKETS FOR NATURE
water, however, may not receive a federal tax incentive, depending on the
context of the donation. Consider first a farmer who is interested in donating
his appropriative or riparian right to a water trust for instream purposes. The
Internal Revenue Code proscribes charitable deductions for "partial interests"
in property." 9 Is an appropriative or riparian right a partial interest? That is
an open question that might well depend on whether the state views the water
right as an independent property interest separate from the land or,
alternatively, as an integral part of the land interest. If the latter, the farmer
might have to donate the land in addition to the water in order to qualify for
a charitable deduction, a donation that neither the farmer nor the trust might
be interested in pursuing. 2 ' Further questions are raised if the farmer wants
to donate his water for only a period of years. Under the Internal Revenue
Code, a contribution of merely the "right to use property shall be treated as
a contribution of less than the taxpayer's entire interest in such property"'-2
which in most situations may preclude charitable deductions for the
equivalent of leases. As noted earlier, however, the bulk of instream
acquisitions have come in the form of leases.
III. ECOSYSTEM SERVICE MARKETS: PRESERVING WATERSHEDS
Markets for instream flow are primarily markets for public goods.
Although some private commercial interests such as resorts, fishing groups,
or downstream hydroelectric facilities may have economic reason to invest
in instream flows,' virtually all instream acquisitions to date have been
made by governments and nonprofit organizations interested in promoting the
119 I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(A) (1999).
120 The Internal Revenue Code does provide an exception for a "qualified conservation
contribution" of real property. Id. But this exception applies only where a property owner
donates his "entire interest ... other than a qualified mineral interest" or a "perpetual
conservation restriction," I.R.S. Reg. § 1. 170A-14, neither of which would appear relevant
in the context of water donations. For a more detailed discussion of this issue (as well as the
question of whether water must be considered "real property" to be deductible), see Kelly
A. Cole, A Market-Based Approach to the Protection of Instream Flow: Allowing a
Charitable Deduction for the Donation of a Conservation Easement in Water Rights, 6
HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 325 (2000).
121 I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(A) (1999).
122 See Sandra Postel & Stephen Carpenter, Freshwater Ecosystem Services, in NATURE'S
SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 195, 196, 198-204 (Gretchen
C. Daily ed., 1997) [hereinafter NATURE'S SERVICES] (listing and discussing the economic
and other benefits from instrean flows).
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general public values of instream flows-species protection, recreation, and
aesthetics. As noted in Part II, funding almost inevitably will be a concern
because of the diffuse and shared qualities of these benefits. Environmental
groups typically are at a disadvantage in lobbying to increase the share of
governmental budgets devoted to public goods such as instream flow, and
nonprofit organizations face a significant collective action problem in
attracting contributions (although federal tax policy partially mitigates this
problem). These funding concerns raise the question whether there are
commercial values to various forms of watershed protection that might
provide significant further funding for watershed preservation.
In this regard, interest has been growing in ecosystem services." 3
Healthy ecosystems provide a variety of commercially valuable services that
we take largely for granted because, for millennia, we have received the
services free of charge. Such services include partial stabilization of climate,
detoxification and decomposition of wastes, air purification, generation and
renewal of soil and soil fertility, crop pollination, and pest control." 4
Because many of these services are extremely valuable, efforts to preserve
ecosystems may be able to capitalize on the value to bring in additional
funding. 25 The key is to find institutions or individuals who benefit from
these ecosystem services and are willing to invest in their preservation.
This Essay focuses on the ecosystem services provided by healthy
and relatively undisturbed riparian lands. These lands are central to
watershed management-the focus of the conference out of which this Essay
grew. These lands also provide two commercially valuable services on which
watershed preservation efforts might readily capitalize-water purification
and flood control. Indeed, because these services are valuable and enjoy a
readily identifiable and organized constituency, riparian lands provide the
123 For the best general introduction to ecosystem services, see the multiple essays in
NATURE'S SERVICES, supra note 122.
124 See Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are Ecosystem Services?, in id. at 1, 3-4.
125 Only a few efforts have been made to quantify the value of ecosystem services, and most
of those efforts have focused on total world value rather than the marginal value of
preserving particular land or resources. A controversial 1997 effort placed a total price tag
of $33 trillion (with a confidence interval from $16 to $54 trillion) on the world's ecosystem
services, 1.8 times the current annual global GNP. See Robert Costanza et al., The Value of
the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253, 259 (1997).
Unfortunately, the Costanza study is exceptionally flawed. See, e.g., David Pearce, Auditing
the Earth, ENV'T, Mar. 1998, at 23 (critiquing the Costanza study, in particular its failure
to value services at the margin). The Costanza study, however, is still indicative of the
exceptionally high value of ecosystem services to human society and industry.
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most likely setting for capitalizing on ecosystem services to promote
preservation.
Preservation and protection of riparian lands promote water quality
in a variety of ways. Commercial use of riparian lands present perhaps the
greatest current pollution threat to the nation's waterways, primarily because
of runoff from agriculture, livestock, roads, and other uses and the leaching
of waste from septic tanks.'26 Wetlands and other riparian lands also help
provide natural filtration of contaminants originating in the watershed.
127
Soils filter out some contaminants from local runoff before the runoff reaches
the waterway. 128 Vegetation both slows down runoff, permitting various
forms of solid pollutants to settle out, and stabilizes soil, reducing
contamination from siltation. f129 A number of major cities in the United
States, including Portland and San Francisco, have long relied on relatively
pristine watersheds for drinking water quality. 30
In the twentieth century, a growing number of water suppliers turned
to technological solutions such as filtration and disinfection to address water
quality problems. Technological solutions, however, are often extremely
expensive. Moreover, technology alone may not provide safe drinking water,
as demonstrated by outbreaks of serious illnesses like cryptospiridiosis in
cities that filter and disinfect their water supplies.' Technological solutions
126 See THE TRUST FOR PUBLIC LAND, AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION: LAND CONSERVATION
AND THE PROTECTION OF CONNECTICUT'S WATER QUALITY 9, 11 (1998) (on file with The
William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review) [hereinafter AN OUNCE OF
PREVENTiON] (describing the various sources of pollution and observing that polluted runoff
is "the single largest threat to water quality in the United States" today); THE TRUST FOR
PUBLIC LAND, PROTECTING THE SOURCE: LAND CONSERVATION AND THE FUTURE OF
AMERICA'S DRINKING WATER 6-8 (1997) [hereinafter PROTECTING THE SOURCE].
127 See PROTECTING THE SOURCE, supra note 126, at 14-17 (concluding that wetlands are the
most valuable means of naturally filtering water supplies); Katherine C. Ewel, Water Quality
Improvement by Wetlands, in NATURE'S SERVICES, supra note 122, at 329 (describing how
wetlands filter nutrients and improve water quality).
128 AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION, supra note 126, at 9; PROTECTING THE SOURCE, supra note
126, at 14.
129 AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION, supra note 126, at 9.
130 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATERSHED MANAGEMENT FOR POTABLE WATER
SUPPLY: ASSESSING THE NEW YORK CITY STRATEGY 23 (2000) [hereinafter WATERSHED
MANAGEMENT].
131 See WATERSHED MANAGEMENT, supra note 130, at 98-101 (noting the outbreak of
waterbome diseases even in water systems that use filtration and other technological
approaches, and describing the outbreak of cryptospiridium in Milwaukee in 1993, affecting
over 400,000 residents); PROTECTING THE SOURCE, supra note 126, at 7 (describing the 1993
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also can have negative side effects in terms of both aesthetics (e.g., the taste
of chlorine in drinking water) and health (e.g., the possible carcinogenicity
of chlorine by-products).' The abandonment of reservoirs because
technological approaches could not keep pace with land development and
thus pollution provides perhaps the most vivid illustration of the limitations
of technological solutions and the critical importance of protecting watershed
lands.'33
In theory, water suppliers can try to protect watershed lands through
either regulation or the acquisition of property interests. In practice, many
water suppliers have found acquisition more effective than regulation for
several reasons.' First, regulations are often difficult to enforce effectively,
particularly where the watershed is in a political jurisdiction distant from the
water supplier. Second, local communities typically fight significant
regulatory efforts by distant water users. 35
Protection of riparian lands can also reduce the risks of flood damage.
Floods cause over four billion dollars in damages on average every year and
outbreak of cryptospiridium in Milwaukee in 1993, which the report notes killed 103
people). One study by the American Water Works Service Company found cryptospiridium
in 54 percent of treated water (86 percent of all source water). PROTECTING THE SOURCE,
supra note 126, at 7. Potential disinfection approaches to cryptospiridium are expensive and
generate by-products with their own potential health risks. Id. at 7-8. See also Glennda
Chui, Tainted Waters, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 20, 2000, at 1F (describing the
inability of current technological approaches to deal with various "micropollutants," such
as medicines and cosmetics, now appearing in water bodies used as sources of drinking
water).
132 See WATERSHED MANAGEMENT, supra note 130, at 102-05 (describing the potential
health problems associated with disinfectant byproducts and the current approaches to
addressing those problems); PROTECTING THE SOURCE, supra note 126, at 6 (discussing the
problems of addressing drinking water quality through chlorination).
133 See PROTECTING THE SOURCE, supra note 126, at 21 (noting Boston's and Atlanta's
abandonment of reservoirs).
134 See THE TRUST FOR PUBLIC LAND, BUILDING GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE: LAND
CONSERVATION AS A WATERSHED PROTECTION STRATEGY 13 (2000), at http://www.tpl.
org/tpllwatershed/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000) [hereinafter BUILDING GREEN
INFRASTRUCTURE] (noting that purchase of fee interests or easements "has turned out to be
the most effective way to create waterway buffers"); PROTECTING THE SOURCE, supra note
126, at 14 (citing a 1991 study by the American Water Works Association Research
Foundation that concluded that land ownership offers the most effective long-term
protection).
135 See BUILDING GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 134, at 22 (describing the
unpopularity of land use regulations in the local watershed communities).
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lead to dozens of deaths.'36 Heavily vegetated riparian lands can slow
precipitation runoff into rivers or streams, enhancing groundwater recharge
and reducing the chances of dangerously high flows.'37 Wetlands also serve
as natural sponges, absorbing additional water during periods of heavy
precipitation or runoff and thus reducing flood potential. 3 Naturally
contoured lands, in contrast to a highly developed region with a channelized
river bed, also provide a natural safety valve against floods, reducing the risk
of flood damage to downstream and upstream regions.'39 When floods do
occur, moreover, undeveloped riparian lands will suffer less economic
damage than land on which significant capital improvements have been
made. 14
0
Land that is preserved for water-quality or flood-mitigation purposes
can also provide valuable public goods for which funding might otherwise be
inadequate. Preserved land, for example, might serve as valuable habitat for
endangered species, provide an aesthetically enjoyable riparian corridor, or
provide low-intensity recreational uses. 14' The preservation of particular
136 See THE TRUST FOR PuBLIC LAND, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PARKS AND OPEN SPACE:
How LAND CONSERVATION HELPS COMMUNITIES GROW SMART AND PROTECT THE BOTTOM
LINE 34 (1999) [hereinafter ECONOMIC BENEFITS] (citing U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
statistics).
137 BUILDING GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 134, at 13; PROTECTING THE SOURCE,
supra note 126, at 17-18; Norman Myers, The World's Forests and Their Ecosystem
Services, in NATURE'S SERVICES, supra note 122, at 215, 216-17, 226-27.
138 See PROTECTING THE SOURCE, supra note 126, at 15 (describing one report that
concluded that Wisconsin watersheds containing 15 percent wetlands had flood peaks 60
percent lower than watersheds with no wetlands); Andrew Wilcox & John Harte, Ecosystem
Services in a Modern Economy: Gunnison County, Colorado, in NATURE'S SERVICES, supra
note 122, at 311, 317 (noting that unimpaired flood plain systems are estimated to store two
to five times as much water as man-made flood plains). According to a 1993 study by the
Illinois State Water Survey, every 1 percent increase in wetlands along a stream corridor
decreases peak stream flows by an average of 3.7 percent. ECONOMIC BENEFITS, supra note
136, at 34.
139 See ECONOMIC BENEFITS, supra note 136, at 34.
140 id.
141 See, e.g., OFFICE OF GROUND WATER AND DRINKING WATER, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, DRINKING WATER SOURCE PROTECTION: CASE STUDIES IN
WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 16 (1999), at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/swpcstudy.html
(last visited Oct. 27, 2000) (observing that frequently the goals of water quality preservation
and habitat protection overlap); id. at 29 (describing Seattle's efforts to protect and preserve
endangered and threatened species within its Cedar River Watershed); BUILDING GREEN
INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 134, at 31 (noting the multiple benefits of land preservation);
ECONOMIC BENEFITS, supra note 136, at 38 (describing potential collateral benefits of
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lands may also provide various non-use values, including existence value,
option value, and bequest value. 42 There is no guarantee that the lands with
commercially valuable services will be the lands we want to preserve for their
public goods: the land in a watershed that is most valuable for water quality
protection, for example, may not be the same land that is critical habitat for
an endangered species. And indeed goals can be inconsistent: a water
supplier that chooses to preserve land for water quality protection may not
want the land used for recreation. But there is a sufficient enough chance of
a substantial overlap in values to believe that the commodification of
ecosystem services can significantly advance a number of environmental
objectives.
A. Acquisitions Motivated by Watershed Services
Investment by water suppliers, cities, and others in the ecosystem
services provided by riparian land is not hypothetical. In perhaps the best
known example, New York City has chosen to invest over a quarter of a
billion dollars in the acquisition and preservation of up to 350,000 acres of
land in the Catskill watershed. 43 Regulations under the federal Safe Drinking
Water Act require water suppliers to filter their water unless the supplier can
demonstrate that it has taken other steps, including protection of the
watershed, that will adequately protect its customers from the risks of
contamination." As noted earlier, filtration can be very expensive and is not
always effective. New York City obtained an exemption from the filtration
protected flood plains near Katy Prairie, Texas, including wildlife habitat and tourism).
142 See, e.g., Lawrence H. Goulder & Donald Kennedy, Valuing Ecosystem Services:
Philosophical Bases and Empirical Methods, in NATURE'S SERVICES, supra note 122, at 23,
34-35 (describing the potential existence and option values of ecosystem services); Sandra
Postel & Stephen Carpenter, Freshwater Ecosystem Services, in NATURE'S SERVICES, supra
note 122, at 95, 206-207 (defining these non-use values and giving examples).
143 See WATERSHED MANAGEMENT, supra note 130 (describing New York City's efforts and
their efficacy); PROTECTING THE SOURCE, supra note 126, at 18-20 (describing the city's
program); Scott D. Anderson, Watershed Management and Nonpoint Source Pollution: The
Massachusetts Approach, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 339, 376-77 (1999) (describing the
city's efforts to avoid filtration requirements of federal law); Graciela Chichilnisky &
Geoffrey Heal, Economic Returns from the Biosphere, 391 NATURE 629, 630 (praising New
York City's effort to "securitize" the watershed services).
144 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(7)(C)(i) (1999) (authorizing EPA to promulgate filtration rules);
Surface Water Treatment Rule, 40 C.F.R. §§ 141.70-.75 (1999); WATERSHED




requirement by not only acquiring sensitive watershed lands, but funding
watershed-based efforts to minimize pollution from farming and
development, paying to improve sewage facilities in the watershed, and
updating and extending its regulation of watershed activities to effectively
police septic systems and other local sources of pollution.145 New York City
estimates that the total cost of its entire watershed-protection program
through 2010 will be about $1.5 billion, far less than the $4-8 billion cost of
constructing a filtration plant (which would also entail annual operating costs
of about $300 million).141
New York City's efforts to preserve watershed land are not unique.
Water companies have long acquired land in their watersheds to protect the
quality of their drinking water. 47 On average, water companies in the United
States own only about two percent of the land in their watersheds.148 In some
portions of the nation, however, water suppliers control a much higher
percentage, including most of the remaining open space.
49
Renewed emphasis on drinking water quality, including the federal
Environmental Protection Agency's filtration regulations, are today driving
additional land acquisition. In the late 1990's, more than 140 cities were
considering watershed conservation in an effort to ensure safe drinking water
for their customers.50 In 1998, Seattle increased its ownership of land in the
145 See DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK
CITY'S WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM: WATERSHED AGREEMENT OVERVIEW, at http://www.ci.
nyc.ny.us/html/dep/html/agreement.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000) [hereinafter
WATERSHED AGREEMENT OVERVIEW] (providing summary of agreement between the city
and EPA); WATERSHED MANAGEMENT, supra note 130, at 517-22 (providing an abridged
version of the agreement); James Kavanaugh, To Filter or Not to Filter: A Discussion and
Analysis of the Massachusetts Filtration Conflict in the Context of the Safe Drinking Water
Act, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 809, 843-46 (describing the key provisions of the
agreement); PROTECTING THE SOURCE, supra note 126, at 18-20 (describing New York
City's planned actions).
146 See WATERSHED AGREEMENT OVERVIEW, supra note 145; Chichilnisky & Heal, supra
note 143, at 630.
14 7 See AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION, supra note 126, at 3, 6, 9 (discussing purchases by water
companies since the mid-19th century, when cholera outbreaks in New York and London
focused the companies on the importance of isolating water supplies from human activities).
148 See PROTECTING THE SOURCE, supra note 126, at 14 (citing a 1991 study by the
American Water Works Association's Research Foundation).
149 See, e.g., id. at 3 (noting that Connecticut water companies own more than 130,000 acres
of watershed lands, equal to more than half of the state's open space and including some of
the "most pristine wildlife habitat and recreation areas in the state").
ISO PROTECTING THE SOURCE, supra note 126, at 20; Chichilhisky & Heal, supra note 143,
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South Fork Tolt River watershed from about 30 to 70 percent through a land
exchange with the Weyerhaeuser Company;... previously Seattle had
acquired close to 100 percent land ownership in the Cedar River watershed,
its other major water source, through land exchanges with the federal
government. 5 2 Portland, Maine is actively purchasing land within 1,000 feet
of its main reservoir and tributaries.'53 Salt Lake City assesses its water
customers a small additional monthly fee to pay for land preservation in the
city's Provo River watershed.'54 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Utilities, in North
Carolina, uses a portion of its capital improvement budget each year to
acquire watershed lands. 5 In a joint interstate effort, New Jersey and New
York have purchased over 17,000 acres of land in Sterling Forest, the
watershed for almost a quarter of New Jersey's population.'56 Both Syracuse,
New York and Rochester, Minnesota have embarked on programs to protect
the cities' water supplies by paying riparian farmers to establish buffer zones
along key water bodies.' Rather than protecting riparian land from any
development, some water suppliers have used easements, leases, or other
financial incentive programs to minimize the size of the footprint that local
activities impose on the land.'
at 630.
151 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 141, at 32; SEATTLE PUBLIC
ACCESS NETWORK, SOUTH FORK TOLT RIVER (1998), at http://www.pan.ci.seattle.ws/
us/util/watershed/tolt/default.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2000). In exchange, Weyerhaeuser
gained almost 1800 acres of second-growth forest that Seattle had elsewhere in the Tolt
River watershed that did not impact the city's water supply. SEATTLE PUBLIC ACCESS
NETWORK, SEATTLE AND WEYERHAEUSER AGREE ON LAND EXCHANGE IN TOLT
WATERSHED (1998), at http://www.pan.ci.seattle.ws/us/util/watershed/tolt/exchange.htm
(last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
152 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 141, at 31-32.
153 Id. at 34.
1S4 Id. at 32-33.
155 BUILDING GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 134, at 19.
156 PROTECTING THE SOURCE, supra note 126, at 12-13; ECONOMIC BENEFITS, supra note
136, at 40; Richard M. Stapleton, The Worth of Water (1999), at http://www.tpl.org/tpl/
legacy<98/waterwth.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
157 Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, Source Water Protection: The National
Conservation Buffer Initiative, Can It Work for You? (1998), at http://www.amwa-water.
org/features/sw_protection/buffer 
_initiative.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2000). Syracuse is
spending $17 million on watershed protection in an effort to avoid spending up to $40-50
million on filtration. Id.
158 See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 141, at 18-19(describing a lease program of the Contra Costa Water District in California designed to
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Fewer examples exist of cities or others investing in watershed
preservation for flood control purposes, but interest is growing in such "soft"
solutions to flood damage. With funding from a voter-approved initiative,
California's Napa County plans to spend $160 million to acquire 500 acres
of flood plain; the county expects that the acquisition will significantly
reduce flood damages, which totaled $500 million in the last four decades of
the twentieth century.'59 Local governments near Boston acquired rights to
8,000 acres of wetlands capable of holding some 50,000 acres of water during
potential flood periods, rather than building a $100 million system of dams
and levees or bearing continued flood damages averaging $17 million
annually."6 Littleton, Colorado, acquired over 600 acres of land for both
flood control and park purposes.'
B. Potential Barriers to Capitalizing on Ecosystem Services
One should have a healthy dose of skepticism regarding how often
water companies, local governments, and other entities will find it
worthwhile to preserve watershed lands. A number of the situations where
water suppliers have chosen to preserve watershed lands, for example,
involve unique settings that are not likely to be widely duplicated. New York
City, for example, was able to escape building a multi-billion dollar filtration
plant not simply because it planned to acquire riparian property, but also
because it promised to engage in extensive regulation, both mandatory and
voluntary, of the watershed. New York City could do this because of its
historic regulatory authority over activities in the watershed; 162 many cities
will lack this power and find it difficult to obtain such authority over the
almost certain opposition of local governments. 163 But the opportunity to
"minimize impacts to environmental resources and reservoir water quality"); id. at 29
(describing Portland, Maine's Plant Grant Program to encourage riparian landowners to
establish buffers).
159 ECONOMIC BENEFITS, supra note 136, at 35.
"° Id. at 37.
161 Id.
162 For background on the unique setting of New York City's efforts to preserve the Catskills
watershed, see New York City's Water Supply: Part I (Stanford Law School Environmental
& Natural Resources Law & Policy Program Case Study No. 036-99, Oct. 1999), at
http://casestudies.stanford.edu. See also BUILDING GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note
134, at 4 (concluding that land acquisition programs must typically build on strong
regulatory programs).
163 Even New York City encountered tremendous opposition from local watershed
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enlist cities, water suppliers, and others in the preservation of watersheds is
significant enough to justify examining how public policies either support or
undermine incentives to invest in ecosystem services.
A number of obstacles can undercut the incentive to invest in
watershed preservation for water quality or flood control purposes. First, the
magnitude of the service value can be difficult to estimate, making it difficult
to justify the cost of watershed preservation to customers or constituents.
New York City's decision to preserve land in the Catskills was a no brainer:
land acquisition, along with the city's other efforts to avoid quality-impairing
land uses in the watershed, excused the city, at least for the moment, from
regulatory mandates that otherwise would have required it to build a multi-
billion dollar filtration facility. Not every city, however, has been successful
in convincing EPA to waive the filtration requirement in return for a
watershed protection program."6 The vast majority of major water suppliers
in the United States, moreover, have already installed filtration systems.'65
Those cities that filter their water will find it difficult to quantify the
additional improvement in water quality provided by acquiring watershed
land and thus to justify to consumers or constituents the increased rates or
taxes needed to pay for the land.166 The problem can be equally severe in
determining the value of acquiring land or easements to reduce flood
damages.
Administrative standards or actions can play a major role in
influencing the value of watershed preservation. In the case of New York
City, EPA's waiver of the filtration requirement played a critical and positive
role-placing an easy to determine and large price tag on the value of
watershed preservation.'67 The simplest means of putting a price tag on
communities to significant exercise of its regulatory or eminent domain powers.
PROTECTING THE SOURCE, supra note 126, at 18-19.
164 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 143 (describing Boston's unsuccessful efforts to avoid
filtration).
165 See id. at 829 (citing EPA statistic that 97 percent of the 235 significant water suppliers
in the nation filter their drinking water).
166 See id. at 854 (citing an independent expert panel convened by Boston for the proposition
that "with filtration, aggressive watershed protectioa could be difficult to maintain"). Even
in these cases, however, water suppliers may be able to determine a value based on the
avoided cost of any additional water quality measures that the supplier can avoid by
protecting the watershed. See, e.g., BUILDING GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 134, at
19 (observing that the city of Gastonia, North Carolina, calculated that it has saved $250,000
a year by diverting water from a higher quality region of Mountain Island Lake).
167 See BUILDING GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 134, at 31 (noting that the EPA gave
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ecosystems and the services they provide is through avoided cost: what costs
does an entity avoid by investing in the preservation of the ecosystem.
16 8
Federal and state environmental agencies have provided a clear "avoided
cost" for watershed preservation not only by waiving filtration requirements
where watershed preservation is adequate, as in the case of New York, but
also by waiving various water monitoring requirements for water suppliers
with significant source protection.
169
In other cases, however, regulation can undercut the value of
preservation. If the government mandates filtration even where watershed
preservation would provide much the same level of protection, water
suppliers may find it difficult to justify a land acquisition program. In these
cases, the water supplier may find it difficult to quantify the added benefits
for the reasons discussed above, or watershed preservation may not bring
sufficient added value to justify today's often high land prices. 70 The
government should mandate technological fixes where they are indispens-
able, but should not inflexibly require technological fixes where a
combination of soft solutions is an effective substitute.
Governmental funding programs similarly may bias entities from
preserving watershed lands. The federal government, for example, has long
subsidized and helped fund water purification facilities and "hard" flood
control measures such as dams and levees. If equivalent financial assistance
the Massachusetts Metropolitan District Commission "the option of acquiring twenty-five
percent of its watershed land as an alternative to a $200-million filtration plant"). The cost
of filtration and other technological approaches to water quality is exceptionally high. The
federal Environmental Protection Agency forecasts that water suppliers in the United States
will need to spend almost $140 billion in infrastructure by the year 2020 to bring their water
systems into compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act. PROTECTING THE SOURCE,
supra note 126, at 5.
168 See Goulder & Kennedy, supra note 142, at 29-31 (discussing how to value ecosystem
services through avoided cost).
169 See AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION, supra note 126, at 10 (noting that EPA and the
Connecticut Department of Public Health have waived water monitoring requirements that
would have cost almost $20 million). The Safe Drinking Water Act also helps indirectly to
encourage water suppliers to preserve watershed lands by requiring states to assess
watershed threats to drinking water. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra
note 141, at v (describing requirements added by the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments
of 1996).
170 Some cities nonetheless may still find watershed preservation worthwhile. Atlanta, for
example, filters its water but is still taking major efforts to protect its watershed. See
Stapleton, supra note 156, at 5 (noting Atlanta's efforts and concluding that "filtered as well
as unfiltered systems must protect their watersheds").
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is not provided for land acquisition, entities trying to decide whether to take
natural or engineering approaches will have an added incentive to adopt the
engineering solution. The federal Environmental Protection Agency has
begun to address this bias in the context of drinking water quality by
extending its revolving loan program to land acquisition (although the federal
government limits to just ten percent the share of each state's loan money that
can be used to acquire land or conservation easements). "' North Carolina has
tried to correct for the traditional bias in favor of engineering solutions by
creating a multi-million dollar grant program for the preservation of riparian
buffer zones in watersheds furnishing urban drinking water.172 The federal
Department of Agriculture also has begun working with cities to provide
funding for agricultural buffer zones in riparian zones.'73
Deficiencies in the political process or in a state's regulation of
utilities can also undercut incentives to invest in watershed preservation.
Where a city is currently cash strapped, for example, the short-term interests
of politicians may lead them to defer watershed purchases (or even to sell
watershed land that the city already owns) despite a significant long-term risk
of drinking water-related illnesses. An investor-owned water company is
unlikely to acquire watershed lands unless the state public utility commission
permits the company to put the full cost of the land in its rate base and thus
recover a fair rate of return on the land. But public utility commissioners,
responsive to the public's demand for low rates but not responsible for
environmental protection, may prove reticent to approve such a request,
particularly if the health value of watershed preservation is uncertain. Even
if the water company is permitted to put the full cost of the land in its rate
base, the water company may later be tempted to sell the land if the land
appreciates in value. Public utility commissions generally value assets for
rate base purposes at historic cost, so companies receive no rate increase
when their properties appreciate; if they sell assets, however, investor-owned
utilities may be able to pass the proceeds on to their shareholders (depending
on the rules of the particular state).
171 BUILDING GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 134, at 34; PROTECTING THE SOURCE,
supra note 126, at 25.
172 BUILDING GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 134, at 19-22; PROTECTING THE SOURCE,
supra note 126, at 25; THE TRUST FOR PUBLIC LAND, CHARTING A COURSE FOR NORTH
CAROLINA'S CLEAN WATER MANAGEMENT TRUST FUND (1999), at http://www.tpl.org/tpl/
tech/watershd/carolina.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
173 See Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, supra note 157 (describing the program
and cooperative programs between various cities and agricultural communities).
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A number of these factors have led both private and public water
companies in Connecticut to sell off watershed property. Connecticut water
companies sold off some 2,000 acres of watershed lands from 1991 through
mid-1997 and, in the late 1990s, had plans to sell off another 2,000 acres.
174
The pace of land sales, moreover, appeared to be quickening.' 7 In some
cases, water companies have stopped using a watershed as a supply source
because of reduced demand and new water quality standards that would
require expensive new filtration facilities; because the watersheds are no
longer used for domestic water supply, the companies can no longer
economically justify holding onto the open space. 76 Much of the land that
is held by the water companies, moreover, has appreciated dramatically since
the land's original purchase; this increase in value is not reflected in water
rates, but the companies can realize the gain in value by selling the land.
177
The companies can then pass the gain through to ratepayers or, in the case of
private companies, to shareholders;77 alternatively, the companies can use the
proceeds to pay for new facilities (which may be required under the Safe
Drinking Water Act or other environmental laws, but difficult to finance
without selling land). 79 The Connecticut Department of Public Utility
Control at times even encourages water companies to sell land in order to
reduce water rates, which is one of the department's central missions." °
Collective action problems may become a problem where no single
entity values watershed services sufficiently to acquire land by itself, but
where the value of the services to multiple entities does exceed the land cost.
Preservation of watershed lands, for example, may simultaneously enhance
water quality, reduce flood damages, increase the beauty of the region,
protect local wildlife, and provide recreational opportunities for local
residents. None of these benefits by itself may be worth the cost of the land
174 AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION, supra note 126, at 3, 13. Over 21,000 acres of land were
classified as so-called "Class Il" lands and thus alienable with little regulatory oversight.
Id. at 3, 7.
17 Id. at 13.
176Id. at 14.
177 Id.
178 Id. The Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control decides on a case by case basis
how private water companies should allocate the proceeds from land sales between
customers and shareholders. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION, supra note 126, at 18-19.
179Id. at 14.
'
80 Id. at 12, 17. The department has increased the percentage of the gain from land sales
that companies can pass on to shareholders in part to encourage companies to sell the land.
id. at 19.
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to be preserved, but combined may far exceed it.'' In an ideal world, the
water companies drawing from the watershed, downstream cities interested
in flood protection, local governments or developers wishing to enhance local
beauty and recreational opportunities, and state and federal wildlife agencies
would come together and jointly agree to purchase the land. In reality,
however, some or all of the involved entities may try to free ride on the
contributions of the others. A water company, for example, may wait for
governmental agencies to invest in the land.
Collective action obstacles may require novel solutions. One
approach, which I have discussed elsewhere, would be the creation of a
special watershed district empowered to tax individuals or entities benefitting
from the watershed services and to use the revenues to acquire watershed
lands or take other protective actions. ' Local communities have long used
special districts as a means to overcome collective action problems in the
provision of services with public good qualities. Farmers, for example, have
formed irrigation districts to import and distribute water supplies and pest
control districts to exterminate crop-threatening insects.' Residents of
flood-prone areas have formed flood control districts to finance dams and
other engineering control measures. Local communities have formed school
districts to provide public education." 4 Each of these various districts is
governed by a board of directors, generally elected by the affected
population, which decides which measures to take and how to apportion the
total cost among the local population, and then implements the measures and
collects the necessary funds. The concept of a watershed services district
would simply take this tried-and-true approach, which has been used to date
1s1 Cf. BUILDING GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 134, at 4 (noting that watershed
preservation efforts are usually driven by multiple goals and must look to multiple funding
sources).
182 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Search for
Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1177-78 (1999).
183 See Brian P. Baker, Pest Control in the Public Interest: Crop Protection in California,
8 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 31, 39-47 (1988) (discussing the history and function of pest
control districts); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and
Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 673, 686-95 (1993) (discussing the history and function of
irrigation districts and other water organizations).
184 These examples are not exhaustive. Urban regions, for example, have also formed
business improvement districts to help finance urban renewal programs. See Mark S.
Davies, Business Improvement Districts, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 187, 201-04




primarily to finance engineering solutions to problems, and use it to ensure
adequate provision of natural services.
A final political obstacle that sometimes has arisen is the perceived
hegemonic relationship between the beneficiaries of the ecosystem services
and the watershed communities. Where land is purchased and preserved by
a distant city or company, the local watershed community can lose tax
revenue, employment opportunities, and a sense of local control.'
Watershed communities, moreover, are often rural and can resent the
perception that their future economic development is being sacrificed for the
benefit of urban areas. Watershed communities therefore may vigorously
oppose even willing-seller land acquisitions and may need separate
compensation and a role in the process by which land is selected for
preservation. Before acquiring watershed land, both New York City and
Portland, Maine had to negotiate exactly such partnerships with local
governments in the watersheds.' 6
IV. MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORS INTO ENVIRONMENTAL
BROKERS
Most policy observers view markets either as an appendage or
alternative to regulation. Traditional water markets, for example, are
supplementary to traditional state regulation of water use. The state regulates
how much water can be withdrawn from a river or aquifer, but then permits
the market to allocate that limited quantity of water among competing users
in what policymakers hope is an economically efficient fashion. In a similar
non-water context, environmental agencies decide how much pollution
factories can emit, but then establish regulatory markets to help allocate the
right to pollute as efficiently as possible. Both public goods markets and
ecosystem service markets can be either substitutes for or supplements to
regulation. The government, for example, can choose to purchase instream
flow rather than mandate reduced diversion or to mandate a minimum level
of instream flow and then supplement that flow with additional acquisitions.
Where ecosystem services are sufficiently valuable, private or public entities
may find it advantageous to pay for ecosystem preservation, reducing or
eliminating the need for regulation.
By contrast, a largely unexplored option would integrate markets into
185 See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 141, at 31, 34
(describing the concerns of Standish, Maine, regarding Portland's land acquisition program).
186 PROTECTING THE SOURCE, supra note 126, at 18-19.
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the regulatory process itself, converting regulators into environmental
brokers. Consider again regulation of water diversions. The government
under an "environmental broker" approach would create a set of instream
flow rights and award them to a governmental entity for management and
enforcement. The government could acquire these rights initially through the
market. Or it could create the rights directly through regulation-
establishing a set quantity of instream flow rights and, if necessary, reducing
diversionary rights accordingly. Market factors need not dictate the initial
level of water rights dedicated to instream flow; the government could
determine the initial quantity of rights through political deliberation. The
critical element of an "environmental broker" approach would not be how or
what quantity of instream rights are created, but the freedom given the
governmental entity holding the rights-the environmental broker-to use
the marketplace to maximize the value of those rights to the environment. If
the environmental broker decided that it had more water than it needed to
satisfy environmental demands at any point in time, for example, it could sell
the excess water to consumptive water users and use the proceeds to purchase
more water at a later point when the additional water is needed. The
environmental broker, in short, would be expected to use the market like any
market participant to maximize the value of its holdings-except that the
environmental broker would measure value in terms of environmental
benefits rather than profits.
In California, the "CALFED" process, designed to address the
environmental needs of the delta formed east of San Francisco Bay by the
confluence of the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers, has proposed a
constrained version of an environmental brokerage approach, dubbed an
Environmental Water Account or EWA.'87 Growing diversions from the
Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers, as well as from the delta itself, have
caused a variety of serious environmental problems, including reduced fish
runs and lower water quality. In a framework for action issued in June 2000,
federal and state agencies with responsibility for the delta proposed to
continue to use regulatory instream flow requirements, set under the
Endangered Species Act and other environmental laws, as the principal delta
protection.18 8 But the EWA would form a second tier of protection.189 The
18 7 The concept of the EWA grew in part out of a report by the Natural Heritage Institute in
1998 proposing a Delta Ecosystem Restoration Authority. See NATURAL HERITAGE
INSTITUTE, AN ENVIRONMENTALLY OPTIMAL ALTERNATIVE FOR THE BAY-DELTA: A
RESPONSE TO THE CALFED PROGRAM 32-35 (1998).
18 8 CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, CALIFORNIA'S WATER FUTURE: A FRAMEWORK FOR
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EWA would start with a set quantity of water rights and then be free to
manage those rights to optimize environmental protection.' The EWA
could require more water to flow through the delta, thus effectively
"borrowing" instream flow, in return for providing EWA water later in the
year to consumptive users.'' Or the EWA could allow more water to be
pumped out of the delta for consumptive use in return for more EWA rights
that it could exercise at a later point when fish were more at risk.' The
EWA could also invest in storage capacity if the EWA believed that the
storage would be valuable in increasing the environmental value of its water
rights.' 3 The EWA, however, could not modify. the basic regulatory
standards; it would manage and try to optimize only the second tier of
instream flow protection.194 As CALFED's revised Phase II report describes
the EWA's role, the EWA would be "used to 'fine-tune' ecological
protection, reallocating EWA assets to provide additional protection to
targeted species as indicated by real-time events."' 95
A. The Potential Advantages of Environmental Brokerage
An environmental brokerage approach enjoys several overlapping
advantages over the traditional regulatory approach. First and foremost, an
environmental brokerage approach both permits and forces governmental
regulators to trade off among environmental options over time in response to
changing conditions and knowledge. Environmental regulations historically
have been quite static. In the instream context, mandated streamflows do not
ACTION 22 (2000) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION].
189 Id.
190 Id. at 21-22, app. C; CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, REVISED PHASE HI REPORT 95-101
(1999) [hereinafter REVISED PHASE II REPORT]. See also Bay-Delta: The Environmental
Water Account (Stanford Law School Environmental and Natural Resources Law and
Policy Program Case Study No. 039-99, 1999) at http://casestudies.stanford.edu [hereinafter
EWA CASE STUDY] (providing background of and information about the EWA).
191 See REVISED PHASE II REPORT, supra note 190, at 96-98; EWA CASE STUDY, supra note
190, at 8-11.
192 REVISED PHASE II REPORT, supra note 190, at 96-98; EWA CASE STUDY, supra note 190,
at 8-11.
193 REvISED PHASE II REPORT, supra note 190, at 97, 99; EWA CASE STUDY, supra note
190, at 10.
194 FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, supra note 188, at 22; REVISED PHASE II REPORT, supra note
190, at 96.
195 REVISED PHASE II REPORT, supra note 190, at 96.
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tend to change, and when they do change, they change slowly.'96 If regulated
flows turn out to be unnecessarily high at any time because of changes in
scientific knowledge or natural conditions, regulators have little incentive to
relax the mandate; the regulators get nothing in return for relaxing the
mandate and may find it difficult to later restore the mandate. If regulated
flows turn out to be insufficient to meet environmental objectives, by
contrast, regulators typically find it difficult to increase flow requirements
over the political opposition of existing water users. An environmental
brokerage approach both permits and rewards value-creating tradeoffs. When
flows are unnecessarily high, the broker benefits from selling water; when
flows are insufficient, the broker can buy the needed flow with proceeds
acquired from selling water at other times. The traditional regulatory process
typically deals with tradeoffs only in the initial setting of regulations: with a
limited quantum of political will power, the government must decide when
and where to demand instream flows. But once the initial instream flows are
set, tradeoffs are seldom revisited.
For similar reasons, an environmental brokerage approach would
provide a more effective institutional framework for adaptive management.
Scientists are near universal in their call for adaptive management, in which
regulatory schemes would incorporate a feedback loop to evaluate the
efficacy of current regulations and modify them in light of that evaluation.
Adaptive management, however, has been institutionally hobbled by the
problems just identified; regulatory rules prove hopelessly sticky.'97 An
environmental broker, however, would have both the flexibility and the
incentives needed to engage in adaptive management. As the CALFED
process concluded in evaluating the merits of an EWA, an environmental
brokerage approach "allows for more creative, flexible and adaptive
responses to real-time developments in the environment."'98
In some cases, an environmental brokerage approach might partially
align the interests of the environment and the regulated community, reducing
future conflict. Environmental interests, for example, have historically
opposed the development of new water infrastructure that would permit the
diversion of more water; although regulations might limit the environmental
harm, the infrastructure has historically promised no benefits to the
196 See id. at 96 (describing prescriptive regulatory standards as "rigid and inefficient").
197 See NATURAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, supra note 187, at 32 (concluding, in the context of
the CALFED process, that "existing institutions generally cannot shift directions quickly in
response to new scientific information").
198 REVISED PHASE II REPORT, supra note 190, at 96.
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environment. Under the proposed EWA, however, new infrastructure could
also benefit the environment. Both environmental interests and water
consumers thus would share a common goal in effective water management.
Finally, and perhaps more controversially, an environmental
brokerage approach would bring useful discipline to the regulatory process.
Markets serve a disciplining function: market participants must think
carefully about their choices, and they are rewarded if they calculate
correctly, and suffer losses if they make poor decisions. The traditional
regulatory process often distributes and cabins decision-making in a way that
undercuts responsibility and thus discipline.'99 Regulators are seldom
rewarded for identifying needed changes in current regulations. Indeed, the
safest course for a regulator is often to stick with the status quo. An
environmental broker, by contrast, would not only enjoy the authority to
make changes based on the new information, but would be subject to intense
criticism for failing to pursue valuable change.
B. The Potential Pitfalls of Environmental Brokerage
Despite its potential attractions, an environmental brokerage approach
faces a number of potential practical problems. One major concern is how
errors by the environmental broker would be handled. As just explained,
markets impose discipline by rewarding wise choices and ruthlessly
punishing bad choices. Companies make the wrong decisions and
consequently fail every day in the private marketplace, and we generally do
not care (except to minimize the costs of paying off creditors and moving
resources into new uses). That is exactly how the market is supposed to
work. Although few people would object to providing governmental
agencies with incentives to make good decisions, most people would not
want instream flows to suffer because of the poor choices of an
environmental broker. If as the result of a poor decision or physical or
biological events that could not have been predicted, an environmental broker
ends up effectively bankrupt, with no water rights but a significant need for
additional instream flow, the government would be confronted by a
problematic choice. The government could let the environment suffer. Or
the government could bail the broker out and provide additional instream
flows through regulation or purchase. Although the latter option would
199 See NATURAL HERITAGE INSTITUTE, supra note 187, at 32 (concluding that, because
responsibility for the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is split among multiple agencies, none
is accountable for the success or failure of protection measures).
2000]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
protect the environment, it would undermine the disciplinary benefits of a
brokerage approach and encourage the broker to make riskier decisions.
A related concern is whether current science and institutions are up
to the job of engaging in the types of tradeoffs that a brokerage approach
encourages. In many situations, for example, scientists may not be able to
determine whether fish need current levels of instream flow. The government
must set regulatory standards even in the face of such uncertainty, but trying
to fine tune instream flows on an active adaptive basis may not be worth the
costs and risk. There is also reason to question whether we can design an
entity to serve as environmental broker that is both sufficiently fast acting
and sufficiently trustworthy. An environmental broker, like governmental
agencies generally, would be a monopolist. Because people fear that
agencies may exercise bad judgment or be corrupted or captured, laws tightly
constrain agency discretion and generally require lengthy and public
decision-making processes. To be effective at rapid adaptation, an
environmental brokerage approach could not incorporate the same degree of
protection. Although the legislature or voters could discipline the broker
after the fact for misjudgment or corruption, damage would already have
taken place.
The EWA responds to these concerns by incorporating a brokerage
approach only into the second tier of instream protection. As a CALFED
report noted, prescriptive standards "generally provide a greater assurance of
the intended protection, in that they do not rely on real-time decisions by
asset managers."2' The CALFED approach tries to achieve both a high level
of assurance and regulatory flexibility by mandating a first tier of protection,
while using a brokerage approach to provide a second level of security:
The prescriptive standards would be used to provide the broad
baseline level of ecosystem protection, and to address specific
species needs that are well established and predictable. The
EWA can then be used to "fine tune" ecological protection,
reallocating EWA assets to provide additional protection to
targeted species as indicated by real-time events.20'
Concerns that the environmental broker might make management mistakes
could be addressed similarly by restricting the flexibility permitted the
broker. In the instream flow context, for example, the broker might be
20 0 REVISED PHASE II REPORT, supra note 190, at 96.
201 Id. at 96.
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permitted to vary initial instream flow rights by only 20 percent, ensuring that
flows would never fall below 80 percent of the original regulatory level.
Both of these approaches-multi-tier protections and constrained
flexibility-would permit the environmental broker to engage in quick
adaptations through the market without as great a risk to environmental
assurance.
An environmental brokerage approach also raises a myriad of
structural issues, many paralleling the concerns just discussed.0 2 Of these
issues, the most important is governance: who should serve as the
environmental broker? From an adaptive management perspective, the ideal
broker would be a single entity, but political concerns are likely to drive the
government to create a hybrid entity responsive to multiple constituencies.2 3
This raises broader questions about the ability of our current environmental
institutions to engage in adaptive management. As noted already, the United
States has responded to fears of capture and corruption by confining
governmental agencies in layers of procedures and rules; responsibility is
often split among multiple agencies. Workable in a largely static world,
these safeguards cannot survive a new emphasis on speed and flexibility and
are inherently incompatible with an environmental brokerage approach.
An environmental brokerage approach is likely to face considerable
political opposition except where proposed as part of a broader set of reform
efforts. Despite the opportunity that an environmental brokerage approach
presents for true adaptive management, many environmental interests will be
suspicious of a brokerage approach for the reasons just outlined. Resource
users, on the other hand, may worry about the potential competition posed by
an environmental broker. An environmental broker, as a governmental
entrant into the water marketplace, may bid up the price of resources for
202 Among the principal issues are (1) the type and quantity of assets with which the broker
should initially be endowed, (2) whether the broker should receive additional funding in the
future, (3) the type of investments and transactions that the broker should be permitted to
pursue, (4) what changes need to be made in existing markets to permit the broker to
effectively participate, and (5) the governance structure of the broker. See REVISED PHASE
II REPORT, supra note 190, at 100-01 (listing major issues needing to be resolved in creating
an EWA); EWA CASE STUDY, supra note 190, at 11-13 (same).
203 In the case of the EWA, for example, the CALFED process proposes to manage the water
account through three federal and state agencies-the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (based
in the Department of the Interior), the National Marine Fisheries Service (based in the
Department of Commerce), and the California Department of Fish & Game--"in
coordination with project operators and stakeholders, through the CALFED Operations
Group." FRAMEWORK FORACTION, supra note 188, at 22.
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private market participants. In gaming exercises run to determine the impact
of an EWA, for example, the EWA increased competition not only for water
but also for conveyance and storage facilities. 2°' The EWA, moreover, used
up a substantial portion of the operational flexibility that exists in the system
that moves water through the Sacramento-San Joaquin water system.2°" The
EWA nonetheless may prove acceptable because it has become an essential
linchpin in a complex set of tradeoffs. Under the current CALFED solution,
the delta will receive greater environmental attention, but farmers and other
water users will be protected against unpredictable future restrictions on
water diversions by the EWA and a "no surprises" policy.0 6
V. CONCLUSION
Policy interest in markets has historically focused on regulatory
markets. Although such markets can help improve the environment,
primarily by reducing the cost of and political opposition to additional
environmental restrictions, they aid efforts to restore and protect the
environment only indirectly. Markets can more directly benefit the
environment through three other approaches discussed in this article: public
good markets in which governmental agencies or non-profit organizations
acquire environmental rights, ecosystem service markets in which entities
that benefit from ecosystem services directly invest in their preservation, and
the merger of markets and regulation in the shape of environmental brokers.
Public good markets are a simple extension of regulatory markets,
permitting the government or non-profits to buy back resource rights that the
government now or in the past chose to allow private users. Some people
may object to the government buying back rights that it created. But public
good markets may prove to be politically more effective than traditional
regulation as a way of obtaining some environmental benefits; as discussed
in Part I, instream flow markets have proven more effective to date in
restoring balance to our nation's waterways than governmental mandates. But
for some of the same reasons that mandatory regulation is politically difficult,
public good markets are likely to be underfunded.
Where environmental restoration and protection produce ecosystem
services, the commercial value of such services presents another potential
204 REVISED PHASE II REPORT, supra note 190, at 100.
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source of funding. Ecosystem service markets present a particular
opportunity for the preservation of wetlands and other riparian lands. As
elaborated in Part II, such lands often provide commercially valuable services
in water purification and flood control. The government can play a major
role in helping to promote such markets by ensuring that its regulations and
funding programs do not mandate or reward technological substitutes and by
finding solutions to collective action problems.
An environmental brokerage approach presents the opportunity to
import the flexibility, speed, and discipline of markets into the regulatory
process. Effective adaptive management is inconsistent with the traditional
regulatory approach, which, partly by design, is beset by a high degree of
inertia. The market offers a very different institutional model that focuses on
speed and disciplined tradeoffs among options and that is thus more
compatible with the essence of adaptive management. But an environmental
brokerage approach also provides less environmental assurance than
traditional regulation. As a result, an environmental brokerage approach for
the moment should play a role only at the margins of traditional regulatory
systems, providing a means of fine tuning regulation without risking
fundamental levels of protection.
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Instream Flow Acquisitions (1990-1999)
Sources: CLAY LANDRY, SAVING OUR STREAMS THROUGH WATER MARKETS: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE (1998), at http://www.perc.org/sos.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2000); WATER
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